University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2022

Lying, Cheating, And The Social Dynamics Of Ethical Decision
Making
Samuel Elliot Skowronek
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Social Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Skowronek, Samuel Elliot, "Lying, Cheating, And The Social Dynamics Of Ethical Decision Making" (2022).
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 5592.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5592

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5592
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Lying, Cheating, And The Social Dynamics Of Ethical Decision Making
Abstract
Unethical behavior in organizations is pervasive. The social and economic consequences of unethical
behavior are profound, and a large body of work in economics, psychology, and management has been
dedicated to investigating organizational misconduct. Despite increased scholarly interest, there has been
a strong methodological convergence in behavioral ethics experiments that has narrowed the scope of
ethical decision-making research. In this dissertation, I use novel experimental methods to advance the
study of ethical decision making both theoretically and methodologically. In Chapters 1 & 2, I highlight the
limits of financially incentivized behavior and demonstrate how fear of shame and fear of embarrassment
guide ethical judgment. In Chapter 1, I show that people will lie and sacrifice financial gain to avoid being
embarrassed in front of others. In Chapter 2, I show that people can learn appropriate behavior from
others’ expressions of shame. I find that people will avoid the behavior that elicits shame in others even
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ABSTRACT
LYING, CHEATING, AND THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF ETHICAL DECISION
MAKING
Samuel Elliot Skowronek
Maurice E. Schweitzer

Unethical behavior in organizations is pervasive. The social and economic consequences
of unethical behavior are profound, and a large body of work in economics, psychology,
and management has been dedicated to investigating organizational misconduct. Despite
increased scholarly interest, there has been a strong methodological convergence in
behavioral ethics experiments that has narrowed the scope of ethical decision-making
research. In this dissertation, I use novel experimental methods to advance the study of
ethical decision making both theoretically and methodologically. In Chapters 1 & 2, I
highlight the limits of financially incentivized behavior and demonstrate how fear of
shame and fear of embarrassment guide ethical judgment. In Chapter 1, I show that
people will lie and sacrifice financial gain to avoid being embarrassed in front of others.
In Chapter 2, I show that people can learn appropriate behavior from others’ expressions
of shame. I find that people will avoid the behavior that elicits shame in others even when
paid to engage in that behavior and when the norms surrounding that behavior are
otherwise ambiguous. In Chapter 3, I draw the conceptual distinction between cheating
behavior and lying behavior. While prior work has considered the terms interchangeable,
by identifying the two behaviors as distinct, I reconcile conflicting findings in behavioral
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ethics. Together, this dissertation highlights the limitations of extant approaches and
expands our understanding of ethical decision making.
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CHAPTER 1
FEAR OF EMBARRASSMENT PROMOTES UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR

Samuel E. Skowronek
Maurice E. Schweitzer

Prior work links fear of embarrassment with constructive organizational behaviors. In this
article, we show for the first time that not only is fear of embarrassment pervasive in the
workplace, but that it also predictably promotes unethical behavior. Across two surveys
of full-time employees (N = 660), we show that approximately three quarters of
employees fear embarrassment in the workplace; across four preregistered experiments
(N = 1,728), we find that individuals systematically engage in costly deception to avoid
fear of embarrassment. Underscoring the critical role of social evaluations in ethical
decision making, our investigation also makes novel methodological contributions. In
contrast to the dominant experimental paradigms in behavioral ethics research that use
economic rewards to incentivize unethical behavior, we introduce paradigms that use
economic incentives to encourage honesty, reflecting the reality that individuals lie far
more often for social and psychological reasons than they do for economic rewards.
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Introduction
“Fear of embarrassment helps bring behavior in line with certain accepted social rules…
Without its impact there would be social anarchy, and social discourse, as it exists,
would be virtually impossible.” - F.X. Gibbons (1990, p. 138)

Fear of embarrassment may play a critical role in the workplace (Fineman, 1996;
Goffman, 1956). It can increase trust behavior (Derfler-Rozin, Pillutla, & Thau, 2010),
shape perceptions of ethical standards (Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014; Warren & SmithCrowe, 2008), help organizations maintain workplace hierarchies (Feldman, 1984), and
promote social order and group cohesion (Fineman, 1996; Gibbons, 1990; Goffman,
1967; Harré, 1990; R. S. Miller & Leary, 1992).
Consistent with this scholarship, many law enforcement agencies have used fear
of embarrassment to incentivize desirable behavior. For example, police departments in
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the United States have posted mug shots of
people convicted of drunk driving on social media to deter drinking and driving
(Chandler, 2019), and judges in the United States have increasingly used embarrassment
to deter illegal activity; in separate cases, judges have sentenced criminals to hold signs
in public spaces that read: “I was stupid”, “I stole mail”, and “I stole from a 9-year-old on
her birthday! Don’t steal or this could happen to you” (Associated Press, 2008, 2009;
Reutter, 2015; Shteir, 2006). A judge in Ohio sentenced men who had solicited sex to
take turns wearing a chicken suit while holding a sign denouncing brothels (Borger &
Jackson, 2008). The judge explained his reasoning, “It is too easy to put people in
2

jail…They go to jail and . . . it does not deter the crime…There is nothing wrong with a
little humiliation and embarrassment” (Donaldson, 2019).
Despite its broad use in the legal system and the constructive role it is presumed
to play in organizations, surprisingly little empirical work has answered calls to explore
how fear of embarrassment influences behavior (Heath & Sitkin, 2001). In our
investigation, we document why this omission is so striking. We provide the first
quantitative evidence that fear of embarrassment exerts a pervasive and powerful
influence in the workplace. In addition, our findings challenge the conceptualization of
fear of embarrassment as a constructive force that promotes adherence to organizational
norms. Though fear of embarrassment promotes constructive behaviors in some domains,
fear of embarrassment can also systematically promote deception and unethical behavior.
Our investigation makes several contributions. First, we provide the first
empirical evidence that both fear of embarrassment and the actual experience of
embarrassment are ubiquitous in the workplace. Second, our findings fundamentally
advance our understanding of the relationship between emotion and ethical decision
making. Third, in contrast to the dominant experimental paradigms in the behavioral
ethics literature that use economic rewards to incentivize unethical behavior, we
introduce experimental paradigms that underscore the importance of emotion and social
evaluations in driving unethical decision making.
Ethical Decision Making
A substantial and growing literature has used experiments to investigate ethical
decision making. This work has advanced our understanding of how economic incentives
(Tenbrunsel, 1998; Warren & Schweitzer, 2018), available justifications (Barkan, Ayal,
3

& Ariely, 2015; Wiltermuth, 2011), and cultural norms (Gunia & Levine, 2019;
Soraperra et al., 2017) impact ethical behavior. Reflecting the magnitude of this
literature, two recent meta-analyses reviewed studies that included nearly 45,000
participants (Abeler, Nosenzo, & Raymond, 2019; Gerlach, Teodorescu, & Hertwig,
2019). Though substantial, the behavioral ethics literature suffers from a number of
important limitations. One key limitation is the relative paucity of experimental
paradigms that scholars have used to study unethical behavior. In fact, this literature has
relied exclusively on experimental paradigms that use monetary rewards to incentivize
unethical behavior. In all of the dominant experimental paradigms, participants who
choose unethical actions earn larger payoffs.
Though many unethical decisions do yield higher payoffs (e.g., lying on an
expense report, cheating on a tax form), people frequently deceive for non-financial
motives. In a longitudinal study of deception, DePaulo and colleagues (1996) found that
of all of the times people lied, they lied for “material gain” only 40 percent of the time.
More often, individuals lied for psychic gains “to make themselves appear kinder or
smart or more honest than they believe themselves to be and to protect themselves from
embarrassment or disapproval or conflict” (1996, p. 991). In related work, these authors
found that impression management concerns are second only to Machiavellianism as
correlates of everyday lying (Kashy & DePaulo, 1996). Notably, both investigations
relied on self-reports, which may suffer from the same impression management concerns
that promote deception. As a result, the actual importance of impression management
concerns as an antecedent to deception may be even greater than these scholars identify
(Leavitt & Sluss, 2015; Serota, Levine, & Boster, 2010).
4

Building on this research, behavioral ethics scholars have identified impression
management as an important factor in ethical decision making (Choshen-Hillel, Shaw, &
Caruso, 2020; Gneezy, Kajackaite, & Sobel, 2018; Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). These
scholars have found that individuals will often curtail their use of deception and forgo
economic rewards to appear honest. This finding has led scholars to assert that
impression management concerns encourage honesty. We challenge this assertion. We
argue that the prior findings that support the assertion that impression management
concerns promote honesty have restricted the way impression management concerns can
impact ethical decision making. In the canonical deception paradigms, the desire to be
honest and the desire to appear honest (i.e., make a favorable impression) both motivate
honesty. In our work, we pit these two motivations against each other. We show that the
desire to make a favorable impression can override the desire to be honest. We show that
in many cases, individuals will be dishonest to make a favorable impression. Our study
designs are very different from those that have been used in prior scholarship. In our
studies, we incentivize participants to act honestly and show that participants will engage
in deception—and lose money—in order to save face.
Ethical Decision Making and Emotions
An important stream of research has begun to explore the link between emotion
and unethical behavior. Several scholars have induced emotions to study links between
emotions and ethical behavior. These studies have found that envy, anger, and anxiety
can promote unethical behavior by, respectively, increasing the perceived psychological
benefits of deception (Moran & Schweitzer, 2008), decreasing empathic concern for
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others (Yip & Schweitzer, 2016), and increasing perceived threats (Kouchaki & Desai,
2015).
Across these investigations, scholars have studied incidental emotions by using
inductions that are unrelated to the ethical dilemma (e.g., watching a movie clip prior to
making an ethical decision). The focus on incidental emotions has enabled scholars to
develop important insights, but this approach is limited in important ways. Individuals
who predict the onset of an aversive emotion (such regret, embarrassment, and sadness)
often experience an anticipatory emotion that guides them away from those negative
feelings (Lerner, Li, Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015). The study of incidental emotions
precludes the investigation of this kind of navigation because it dissociates the emotion
from its cause. In our investigation, we treat fear of embarrassment as an integral emotion
and test how fear of embarrassment motivates behavior in response to the stimuli that
evoked it.
Embarrassment
Embarrassment is a quintessential social emotion. In contrast to other emotions,
embarrassment occurs almost exclusively in the presence of others (Goffman, 1967;
Keltner & Buswell, 1997; R. S. Miller, 1992, 1996; Schlenker, 1980). Individuals feel
embarrassed when they wish to create or maintain a positive impression, but perceive that
observers have seen them commit a pratfall or demonstrate ineptitude (Edelmann, 1987;
Keltner & Buswell, 1997; R. S. Miller, 1996). We build on prior work (Edelmann, 1987;
R. S. Miller, 1996; R. S. Miller & Leary, 1992; Schlenker, 1980) to define
embarrassment as an aversive state of mortification that reflects a feeling of threat to the
way individuals wish to be perceived by others.
6

Most empirical studies of embarrassment have focused on differentiating
embarrassment from shame and guilt (Keltner & Buswell, 1996, 1997; R. S. Miller, 1992;
R. S. Miller & Tangney, 1994; Parrott & Smith, 1991; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, &
Barlow, 1996). Little research, however, has studied how embarrassment influences
behavior.1 This is a surprising omission because, as we document, embarrassment
pervades organizations and can profoundly influence decision making. In our work, we
address this open question by investigating how the prospect of embarrassment
influences behavior.
Fear of Embarrassment
Every social encounter holds the possibility of embarrassment (Goffman, 1967; R.
S. Miller, 1996) and, as a result, fear of embarrassment is omnipresent. Fear of
embarrassment arises whenever individuals doubt that they are capable of making a
favorable impression on others (Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Schlenker & Leary, 1982).
We conceptualize fear of embarrassment as an anticipatory emotion, like
anticipated regret or anticipated guilt (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001;
Mellers & McGraw, 2001). Anticipatory emotions can significantly affect individuals’
risk perceptions and cognitive appraisals (Baron, 1992; Baumeister, Vohs, Nathan
DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Schlösser, Dunning, & Fetchenhauer, 2013). For example, prior
work has shown that anticipated regret influences escalation of commitment (Wong &

1

We searched for articles in top management journals (Journal of Applied Psychology, Academy of
Management Journal, Academy of Management Review, Organization Science, Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, and Administration Science Quarterly) for work published on
embarrassment. Specifically, we used Web of Science to conduct a search for the word stem “embarrass” in
the title, abstract, author generated key words, and KeyWords Plus (key words generated by a machine
learning tool that searches within the article) in all articles published in these journals since 1990. Our
search returned only twelve articles. In contrast, this same search yielded 93 articles for the key words
“anger” or “angry.” This search was conducted on September 10, 2020.
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Kwong, 2007) and perceptions of fairness (Van der Schalk, Kuppens, Bruder, &
Manstead, 2015), and that anticipated guilt and anticipated gratitude influence job
performance (Grant & Wrzesniewski, 2010). Building on prior work (Van Boven,
Loewenstein, & Dunning, 2005), we consider fear of embarrassment as the negativelyvalenced anticipatory emotion characterized by the anticipation of embarrassment.
Scholars have made broad claims about the social importance of fear of
embarrassment. Fear of embarrassment has been considered a powerful emotion that
serves as “an essential component of socialization and social control” (R. S. Miller &
Leary, 1992, p. 209). This conceptualization has led some scholars to consider fear of
embarrassment as the primary driver of classic conformity behavior, such as the
bystander intervention effect, pluralistic ignorance, and obedience (Sabini, Siepmann, &
Stein, 2001; Sabini & Silver, 2005). Work to support these conjectures, however, is
sparse. Only a handful of studies have directly documented how fear of embarrassment
influences behavior.2 This work has found that individuals will forego monetary rewards
(Brown, 1970) and avoid interacting with others to avoid potentially embarrassing events
(Edwards, 1975; McDonald & McKelvie, 1992; Teichman, 1973).
The paucity of quantitative evidence has not deterred speculation about fear of
embarrassment. Organizational scholars have conjectured that fear of embarrassment
plays a crucial role in enforcing organizational norms (Clark, 1990; Fineman, 1996) and
codes of conduct (Crozier, 1990; Warren & Smith-Crowe, 2008). In fact, scholars have
asserted—with little evidence—that fear of embarrassment represents the “major

2

Most studies dedicated to investigating the behavioral consequences of fear of embarrassment were
conducted in the 1970s with a limited number of studies and small sample sizes. For example, Brown
(1970), conducted two 2x2 laboratory experiments with 48 and 44 participants in each experiment.
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affective instrument of conformity” (Harré, 1990, p. 181) that “ensure[s] that behavior in
organizations hold to certain normative codes” (Fineman, 1996, p. 551). That is, scholars
have assumed that fear of embarrassment motivates employees to conform to
organizational rules. Although some organizational scholars have considered drawbacks
to high levels of fear of embarrassment (Edmondson, 1999; Morrison & Milliken, 2000),
the drawbacks scholars have identified (e.g., not criticizing others’ ideas) derive from an
underlying desire to follow organizational rules.
Taken together, prior work has presumed that the anticipation of embarrassment
motivates adherence to social norms and codes of conduct and helps organizations
maintain order and organizational hierarchies. We challenge these assumptions. Rather
than deterring subversive behaviors and promoting desirable behaviors, we demonstrate
that the fear of embarrassment can promote unethical behavior.
Fear of Embarrassment and Deception
Behavioral ethics scholars have overlooked fear of embarrassment as a potential
antecedent to ethical decision making. We assert that this is an important omission for
three reasons. First, fear of embarrassment powerfully motivates behavior. Across a
diverse set of social situations, scholars have demonstrated that fear of embarrassment
plays a profound role in individual decision making (Brown, 1970; Latané & Darley,
1970; Leary, Tchividijian, & Kraxberger, 1994; D. T. Miller & McFarland, 1987).
Second, embarrassment is very likely to influence ethical decision making.
Embarrassment is routinely grouped with guilt and shame as one of three negativelyvalenced, self-conscious moral emotions (Lewis, 1993; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek,
2007; Tracy & Robins, 2004). Although embarrassment, guilt, and shame guide
9

individuals to reflect upon themselves in relation to ideal social or moral standards
(Tangney, Mashek, & Stuewig, 2005; Tracy et al., 2007), and anticipated guilt and shame
have both been linked with ethical decision making (Tangney et al., 2007), no prior work
has linked embarrassment or fear of embarrassment with ethical decision making.
Third, fear of embarrassment has been linked with withdrawal behaviors. The
medical decision making literature points to fear of embarrassment as an antecedent to
failing to exercise (Courneya & Hellsten, 1998), delaying testing for STDs (Leenaars,
Rombouts, & Kok, 1993), delaying cancer screening (Consedine & Moskowitz, 2007),
and failing to use or purchase condoms (Dahl, Manchanda, & Argo, 2001; Herold, 1981).
This literature shows that when adherence to social norms appears insufficient to avoid
embarrassment, fear of embarrassment can promote avoidance and self-harm.
Together, these research streams show that fear of embarrassment is a powerful
emotion, that it is closely tied to other emotions that influence moral decision making,
and that it can motivate undesirable withdrawal. We argue that when conformity and
avoidance appear insufficient to maintain a positive impression on others, fear of
embarrassment promotes unethical behavior. We therefore make the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Compared to individuals in a neutral state, individuals
experiencing fear of embarrassment are more likely to engage in unethical
behavior.
Others’ Beliefs
Fear of embarrassment reflects a concern that others will form negative
judgments. One strategy to mitigate this concern is to offer explanations for the
10

potentially embarrassing behavior. For example, explanations such as “It was an
accident,” “I’m not the only one who…” “I didn’t know,” and “He (she) made me do it”
(Sharkey & Stafford, 1990, p. 337) may diminish perceptions of responsibility and
ultimately curb feelings of embarrassment (Cupach & Metts, 1992; Metts & Cupach,
1989; Sharkey & Stafford, 1990). Similarly, scholars have speculated that in-store
purchases of Penthouse and Playboy are more often accompanied with other nonembarrassing purchases relative to purchases of Newsweek and Time, because “buying
additional items such as gum or candy can be seen as a means of saying ‘I really came in
to buy other things’” (Lewittes & Simmons, 1975, p. 42; Blair & Roese, 2013). This
reasoning also helps account for the finding that individuals in experimental studies are
more willing to embarrass themselves in front of others for monetary rewards when they
know that audience members are aware of the monetary reward than when they know that
audience members are unaware of the payment (Brown, 1970). These findings highlight
the important role of explanations in moderating the influence of fear of embarrassment
on unethical behavior. Individuals can limit the negative inferences that audience
members make about them if they can attribute their counter-normative behavior to an
external cause. In contrast, individuals who are unable to offer an explanation for their
counter-normative behavior are unable to curb their impression management concerns.
We predict that individuals who are unable to offer an explanation for an embarrassing
action they will need to perform will be more likely to deceive to avoid having to perform
the embarrassing action. When the target behavior is socially acceptable, however, the
influence of available explanations is significantly diminished. Building on this logic, we
develop our second hypothesis:
11

Hypothesis 2: Audience knowledge will moderate the relationship between fear
of embarrassment and unethical behavior: For the same embarrassing activity,
individuals are more likely to engage in unethical behavior to avoid it when they
are unable to explain the reason for their embarrassing behavior compared to
when they are able to provide an explanation.
Perspective taking
High arousal emotion, such as anger and fear of embarrassment, can trigger “hot”
cognitive states (Van Boven et al., 2005; Yip & Schweitzer, 2019). Compared to low
arousal states, hot states can promote quicker and riskier decision making (Evans, 2008;
Leith & Baumeister, 1996). Hot cognition enables individuals to make faster decisions
(Keltner & Haidt, 2001), but it may degrade the quality of decisions. In particular, we
consider how fear of embarrassment may impair perspective taking in a way that causes
individuals to be more likely to engage in deception.
Prior work has found that individuals judge the same embarrassing activity to
pose a greater social cost to themselves than to others (Edelmann, 1987). That is,
individuals expect that others would be less ostracized after engaging in an embarrassing
action than they would be themselves. As a result of this perspective-taking failure,
individuals may rationalize selfish behavior, believing that the social costs others incur
for engaging in an embarrassing action is smaller than the social costs they themselves
would incur for engaging in the same action.
Similarly, individuals often believe that others are less embarrassable than
themselves (Prentice & Miller, 1996; Van Boven et al., 2005). In one study, Van Boven
and colleagues (2005) asked participants to perform an embarrassing act in exchange for
12

a payment. They found that participants expected that others would demand less
compensation—implying they would be less embarrassed—than they would be
themselves. When confronted with the prospect of an embarrassing experience,
individuals collapse their focus on the upcoming experience and fail to take others’
perspectives. Behavioral ethics research has shown that this type of perspective-taking
failure can decrease empathic concern for others (Martinez, Stuewig, & Tangney, 2014)
and increase the tendency to behave unethically (O’Reilly & Doerr, 2020; Yip &
Schweitzer, 2016, 2019).
Interestingly, these perspective-taking failures are also unexpected. Individuals in
a cold cognitive state not only fail to exhibit these cognitive distortions, but they also fail
to anticipate them (Van Boven, Loewenstein, Welch, & Dunning, 2012). Taken together,
we assert that fear of embarrassment causes an unexpected concern for the self, which
prompts individuals to take action to engage in self-protective, and potentially otherharming behavior. This reasoning leads us to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The inability to take the perspective of others will mediate the
relationship between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior.
Research Overview
We report the results of two survey studies, two laboratory experiments, and two
online experiments. In Study 1a, we find that both fear of embarrassment and the
experience of embarrassment are commonplace at work. In addition, we find that half of
employees admit that they lie to avoid feeling embarrassed at work. In Study 1b, we
show that the deception employees engage in to avoid embarrassment at work frequently
harms the organization.
13

Across four experiments, we induce fear of embarrassment and link fear of
embarrassment with deception. These studies document the first evidence linking fear of
embarrassment with unethical behavior. In Study 2, we show that fear of embarrassment
can promote unethical behavior. In Study 3, we incentivize truth-telling and find that
participants will still lie to avoid embarrassment. In Study 4, we incentivize truth-telling
and test whether the inability to take others’ perspectives mediates the relationship
between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior. In Study 5, we incentivize truthtelling a third time and test the moderating effect of audience knowledge on the
relationship between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior. Throughout this
work, we show that, rather than promoting conformity or constructive behavior, fear of
embarrassment can promote unethical behavior. We preregistered all experiments and
analyze and report all manipulations and measures here
https://osf.io/uqfhn/?view_only=f2be5e46e9e14cd480b434e74b9c6d44
Study 1a
Though scholars have asserted that embarrassment is pervasive, no published
work (to the authors’ knowledge) has documented how often people feel or fear
embarrassment. Stonehouse and Miller (1994), in an unpublished poster, present the only
quantitative data on the frequency with which embarrassment is experienced. These
authors asked college students to record their embarrassing experiences in a diary over an
eight-week period. They found that college students experience embarrassment about 1.5
times every seven days. No study has documented the frequency of embarrassment in the
workplace nor has any study documented whether fear of embarrassment motivates
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employees to take action to avoid it. In Study 1a, we assess the frequency of both the fear
and experience of embarrassment in the workplace.
Method
Participants
We recruited 504 full-time employees via Prolific (43% female, Mage = 34.57
years, SD = 9.79) in exchange for $0.50. A total of 502 participants completed the survey
and, on average, participants had 13.97 years (SD = 9.86) of work experience. We
analyze all responses.
Design and Procedure
After passing an attention check, participants answered the following four
questions: 1) Have you ever felt embarrassed at work?, 2) Have you ever worried about
feeling embarrassed at work?, 3) Have you ever taken action to avoid feeling
embarrassed at work?, and 4) Have you ever lied to avoid feeling embarrassed at work?.
Participants then indicated how often this occurs for each question they answered
affirmatively.
Results
Most participants reported that they experience (80%) and worry about
experiencing (71%) embarrassment in the workplace. Moreover, 74% of participants
report taking action to avoid embarrassment at work and almost half of the respondents
(49%) report that they have lied to avoid embarrassment at work (see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1
The frequency that full-time employees experience, fear, take action, and lie to avoid
embarrassment at work.

Note: In Study 1a (N = 504), we asked full-time employees four questions about the
experience of embarrassment at work. The figure reports how participants answered each
question. We used an empty OLS regression to derive the errors bars. Vertical lines
represent ±1 standard error.
We find that embarrassment is a pervasive workplace emotion. Approximately
half of participants report feeling embarrassment (45%) or worry about being
embarrassed (53%) at work at least once per month. Moreover, 50% of participants report
taking action to avoid embarrassment at least once per month and 31% of participants
report doing so at least once every couple of weeks. Approximately one fifth of
participants (19%) report lying to avoid embarrassment at least once per month. In the
Supplementary Materials, we report the complete frequencies and percentages of how
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often participants report each of these experiences (Table S1) and how these experiences
correlate with basic workplace demographics (Table S2).
Discussion
These findings reveal that approximately three quarters of employees fear,
experience, and act to avoid embarrassment at work and that half of employees have lied
to avoid embarrassment at work. Individuals are often averse to disclosing unflattering
information (Tourangeau & Yan, 2007), so these reported values likely understate the
prevalence and adverse consequences of embarrassment in the workplace.
Study 1b
Study 1a reveals that employees frequently lie to avoid embarrassment. Lies,
however, are not always harmful (Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). In fact, much of the
impression management literature has assumed that impression management concerns,
when they motivate deception, motivate prosocial or “white” lies (Schlenker & Pontari,
2000). In Study 1b, we investigate the kinds of lies employees tell to avoid
embarrassment. In particular, we explore whether fear of embarrassment motivates lies
that harm the organization.
Participants
We recruited 156 full-time employees via Prolific (41% female, Mage = 33.58
years, SD = 9.45) in exchange for $0.70. On average, participants had 13.84 years (SD =
9.63) of work experience. A total of 151 participants completed the survey. We analyze
all responses. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ma69xs).
Design and Procedure
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Participants first answered the four questions we included in Study 1a assessing
the frequency with which they experience, fear, and act to avoid embarrassment at work.
We then asked participants who reported that they had lied to avoid embarrassment at
work to describe a recent time they had lied to avoid embarrassment, to describe what
they were concerned about, and to describe how their lie differed from the truth (see
Supplementary Materials for exact text of each question).
Following our preregistered analysis plan, two research assistants coded
participants’ open-ended responses and categorized the lies they reported. These research
assistants assessed whether the lies harmed the organization.
Results
Consistent with our findings in Study 1a, 43% of participants reported that they
had lied to avoid embarrassment at work. Raters judged many of the lies to be harmful to
the organization (40%), about half not to be harmful (53%), and we were unable to
categorize a few (6%). In exploratory analysis, we noticed that many lies people told
were to their supervisor. We found that 28% of lies that could be categorized were lies
respondents told to their supervisors. Examples of lies that harmed the organization
include the following:
Example 1. I messed up the count on the register so I blamed someone else for the
error. It was my mistake…The manager accepted my story and just ‘kept an eye
out’ for more errors…- Female, 32 years of age, 16 years of work experience.
Example 2. I told a superior that I knew how to handle a problem/project when I
didn’t. I lied. I did not know how to handle the problem/project and as the weeks
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went on I did not get any work done…- Female, 32 years of age, six years of work
experience.
Example 3. I explained that something was not possible... I later found out the
thing I mentioned was impossible was actually possible. I did not correct the
error, but allowed others to pursue an alternative method of resolving the
problem...- Male, 32 years of age, nine years of work experience.
Discussion
Results from Studies 1a and 1b reveal that fear of embarrassment is pervasive in
organizations and can be harmful to them. We establish these findings across two
surveys, even though social desirability concerns may have caused respondents to
understate the frequency with which they engaged in harmful behaviors to avoid
embarrassment.
Studies 2, 3, 4 and 5
We extend our investigation in Studies 2-5 to document the causal relationship
between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior. Across these studies, we use
different inductions and different experimental paradigms to measure unethical behavior.
We consistently find that fear of embarrassment promotes unethical behavior.
Study 2 Miming
In Study 2, we conduct the first experimental test of the relationship between fear
of embarrassment and unethical behavior. In Study 1b we find that fear of embarrassment
in the workplace is often triggered by the presence of an evaluative audience. Therefore,
in Study 2, we use an evaluative audience as part of our fear of embarrassment induction.
Method
19

Participants
We recruited 241 individuals affiliated with a university in the northeastern
United States to participate in a behavioral lab study in exchange for $10. A total of 239
participants completed the study (69% female, Mage = 20.82 years, SD = 3.10). One
participant left the study after hearing the instructions and one participant experienced a
technical problem and did not generate data. We report the number of participants in each
session in Table S3. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org:
aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=m4pe9x.
Design and Procedure
Our procedure involved two stages. In the first stage, participants completed an
anagram (word unscrambling) task (Ruedy & Schweitzer, 2010). We informed
participants that their performance on this task would determine what they would do in
Stage 2 of the experiment and we gave participants the opportunity to self-report their
performance.
Stage 1: Cheating Task. In the first stage of the experiment, we handed
participants a manila folder. Inside the folder was a worksheet labeled “Task 1”. The
Task 1 worksheet contained 30 letter strings (e.g., “AETMKR”). We asked participants to
solve as many of the anagrams (e.g., “MARKET”) as they could in three minutes.
After three minutes, the experimenter instructed participants to stop working and
to tear the Task 1 worksheet from the manila folder. The experimenter then collected the
manila folder. After learning about the second part of the study, the experimenter
distributed the answer key and asked participants to correct their own work and submit
their scores. Unbeknownst to participants, the manila folder contained a sheet of carbon
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paper that recorded the anagrams that participants had solved. We detect cheating in this
paradigm by comparing the correctly solved anagrams on the carbon paper to the number
of anagrams participants reported that they solved. We include details of this method and
an image of the carbon paper in Appendix A and the Supplementary Materials.
Stage 2: Fear of Embarrassment Manipulation. In the second stage of the
experiment, the experimenter handed each participant a packet labeled “Task 2” and read
the instructions aloud. Across sessions, we assigned participants to either the Fear of
Embarrassment condition or the Control condition.
In both conditions, participants learned that they would be assigned to one of two
roles and that their role would be determined by their performance on Task 1. In the Fear
of Embarrassment condition, participants learned that they would either be an Actor or an
Evaluator. In the Control condition, participants learned they would be either be a Helper
or a Sitter.
We told participants that top performers on Task 1 (those who performed above
the median) would be assigned to the role of Evaluator (or Sitter in the Control condition)
and the bottom half of performers would be entered into a raffle to determine which two
participants would be the Actors (or Helpers in the Control condition). Participants in the
bottom half who were not selected by the raffle would be Evaluators (or Sitters). In the
Fear of Embarrassment conditions, we described the Actor and Evaluator roles in the
following way:
Actor: Each person assigned to be an actor will stand at the front of the lab and
will perform two mimes, each for 30 seconds. Actors might mime animals (like an
elephant or a snake), inanimate objects (like a washing machine or a piece of
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scotch tape) or human functions (like feeling constipated or feeling surprised). We
will show the actors an index card that tells them what mime to perform, at which
point the actors will immediately start their performances. Actors will not have
time to prepare.
Evaluator:
If you are assigned to the role of evaluator, you will move your chair so that you
can see the actors’ performances, receive a clipboard with an evaluation sheet,
and critically evaluate the actors’ performances. On the evaluation sheet, you will
also be asked to guess what the actors are performing.
In the Control condition, we described the Helper and Sitter role in the following way:
Helper:
Each person assigned to be a helper will help the experimenters with two tasks,
each for 30 seconds. Helpers might pass out pens or post-it notes. Helpers will
know what they will perform after they are assigned to that role.
Sitter:
If you are assigned to the role of sitter, you will sit in your chair quietly for two
minutes.
After hearing these instructions, participants in the Fear of Embarrassment
condition reviewed the three-question evaluation sheet that participants assigned to be
Evaluators would use to evaluate each Actor’s performance. The experimenter then
directed participants to the final page of their packet that contained an answer key to the
anagram task. We instructed participants to use the answer key to count the number of
anagrams they correctly solved and to write their total at the bottom of their Task 1
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worksheet. The experimenter then collected the Task 1 worksheets, conducted the raffle
for participants below the median score, and announced the lab IDs of the two
participants drawn from the raffle.
The two participants selected by the raffle came to the front of the room. The
experimenter handed clipboards to the Evaluators and instructed them to gather around
the Actors to view their performances. The experimenter then handed an index card to the
first Actor that read “Waterfall,” whereupon the Actor mimed a waterfall for 30 seconds
while the Evaluators completed the evaluation sheet. The first actor then performed a
second mime (“Bicycle”) and was evaluated, and then the second actor performed two
mimes (“Blender” and “Dog”) and was evaluated. In the Control condition, participants
assigned to be Helpers passed out office supplies to the other participants. The first
Helper passed out paper clips and index cards, and the second Helper passed out pencils
and rubber bands.
After the performances, we handed all participants a questionnaire that asked
them to indicate how much they felt confident, self-assured, embarrassed, anxious,
uncertain, and competitive (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). We also asked participants to
describe how they felt when they first learned that they might be assigned to the role of
Actor (Helper) and their age and gender. Finally, we debriefed, compensated, and
dismissed the participants.
Results
Cheating. The amount of cheating was greater in the Fear of Embarrassment
condition than it was in the Control condition. Specifically, participants in the Fear of
Embarrassment condition (N = 127) claimed to have solved nearly two anagrams (M =
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1.89, SE = 0.29) more than they had actually solved, over-stating their performance by an
average of 27%. Participants in the Control condition (N = 112) over-stated their
performance significantly less, by about one anagram (M = 1.08, SE = 0.23, t(237) = 2.16, p = .031, d = 0.28). We depict this result in Figure S1.
The magnitude of cheating was different across conditions, but the incidence of
cheating was not significantly different; the number of participants who cheated in the
Fear of Embarrassment condition (44%) was not significantly greater than the number of
participants who cheated in the Control Condition (38%, 𝜒2(1, N = 239) = 1.07 p = .301,
d = 0.13).
Experienced Embarrassment. Our manipulation shifted feelings of felt
embarrassment. Participants assigned to the role of Actor (N = 26) were significantly
more embarrassed (M = 4.77, SE = 0.27) after their performances compared to those
assigned to the role of Helper (N = 26) (M = 3.12, SE = 0.30, t(50) = -4.11, p = .0001, d =
1.14). In addition to finding a difference for embarrassment, we also found a difference
for feelings of competitiveness, but we did not find significant differences for selfassuredness, confidence, uncertainty, or anxiety. In Table S4, we report the effect of
condition assignment for all of the measures we collected.
Discussion
Prior work that has conceptualized fear of embarrassment as an emotion that
promotes social cohesion and ethical behavior. This study is the first to demonstrate that
fear of embarrassment can promote unethical behavior. Rather than promoting
constructive organizational behavior, fear of embarrassment may promote deception and
cheating.
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Study 3: Condoms and Bananas
In Study 3, we extend our investigation in three key ways. First, we introduce a
new embarrassment induction that affords a more conservative test of our thesis and is
methodologically easier to use. The fear of embarrassment induction we introduce in this
study does not involve an evaluative audience. Second, we introduce a new paradigm to
measure unethical behavior. Third, we incentivized participants to behave honestly with a
cash bonus.
Participants
We recruited 253 individuals affiliated with a university in the northeastern
United States to participate in a behavioral lab study in exchange for $10.00. All
participants were under the age of 30. We analyze 251 of these participants (74% female,
Mage = 20.73 years, SD = 1.92).3 This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org
(aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=z37ni5).
Design and Procedure
In each of the 21 sessions of this experiment, we randomly assigned all
participants in each session to either the Fear of Embarrassment condition or the Control
condition. In both conditions, participants walked past a table as they entered the
behavioral lab and sat at their assigned cubicles. In the Fear of Embarrassment condition,
participants walked past a table that had two large glass bowls full of condoms and three

3

In accordance with our preregistration, we exclude two participants who participated for course credit and
who could not earn monetary compensation for this study. We chose to exclude these participants a priori
because they answered the primary dependent variable knowing that they could not earn extra money for
being assigned to the role of Actor. The statistical significance of the results does not change if we include
these participants in the analyses.
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bunches of bananas. In the Control condition, participants walked past a table with a ream
of letters and a large box of envelopes.
Participants sat at individual cubicles, and in each cubicle participants had a
consent form, two pieces of paper faced down (labeled “Page One” and “Page Two”) and
two plastic cups stacked on top of each other. After collecting the consent form, the
experimenter asked participants to turn over Page One and follow along as the
experimenter read the instructions aloud. Participants learned that they would be assigned
to either the role of Actor or the role of Observer. We informed participants that those
assigned to the role of Observer would be escorted into the focus room and watch all of
the Actors’ performances.
We described the Actors’ performances differently across the two conditions.
Participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition learned that each Actor:
…will be escorted into the focus room one at a time. In the focus room, Actors
will be handed three bananas and three condoms. Actors will place one condom
on each banana in front of the observers. Actors will have 30 seconds to place all
three condoms.
Participants in the Control Condition learned that each Actor would have 30
seconds to fold three letters and place these letters in three envelopes in front of the
Observers.
We informed participants that we would assign them to the role of Actor or
Observer based upon the outcome of their roll of two dice. The roll of two dice in this
study is actually part of a new paradigm we introduce to detect unethical behavior in the
laboratory, the Odd-Even Dice Task. This task is similar to the die-in-cup task (Shalvi,
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Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011), but in contrast to the die-in-cup task it enables
researchers to directly measure cheating. That is, rather than relying on statistical
inferences, the Odd-Even Dice Task can detect cheating at the individual level.
Odd-Even Dice Task. We informed participants that the stacked cups on their
cubicle contained two six-sided dice, and that each possible dice roll corresponds to a
certain number of points. We told participants that those with the most points (The Top
Half) would be assigned to the role of Observer and that those with the fewest points
(The Bottom Half) would be assigned to the role of Actor. We provided participants with
a Dice Scoring Table on the back of Page Two (See Appendix A) that indicated how
many points participants would earn for each possible dice roll.
The two dice participants rolled looked like regular dice, but in reality, were quite
different. Instead of fair six-sided dice, we gave participants one Odd Die that only
included numbers 1, 3, and 5, and one Even Die that only included numbers 2, 4, and 6
(See Appendix A). For both dice, the duplicated numbers were on opposite sides of the
cube. When participants rolled their dice, the sum of their dice always yielded an odd
number. The Dice Scoring Table translated their dice roll to points. In this table, rolls that
correspond to odd numbers earn 10 points; rolls that correspond to even numbers earn
points ranging from 11 to 22. That is, any participant who reports an even number
misrepresented their role to earn additional points.
Across both conditions, participants silently read instructions informing them that
if they were assigned to the role of Actor, they would earn a $1.00 bonus for completing
this study, but that Observers would be unaware of this bonus during their performance.
We informed participants that their cubicle had been randomly selected for these
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additional instructions. As a result, participants were unaware that others in the room had
this additional information.
Participants then rolled the dice in the cup and reported the number of points they
earned at the bottom of Page One. The experimenter then collected both pages and
handed participants a three-question survey that asked participants two questions to
assess fear of embarrassment: “If you are assigned to the role of Actor, how concerned
are you that the Observers in the focus room will evaluate you negatively?” and “If you
are assigned to the role of Actor, how embarrassed do you expect to be when you
perform in front of the Observers?” (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). The last question
asked participants to describe the study in their own words. The experimenter then
collected these surveys and announced that there was not enough time to complete the
study.
Results
Suspicion. To assess suspicion about the dice, we asked participants to describe
the study in their own words. In the descriptions participants provided, none reported any
skepticism about the dice.
Manipulation check. The two items designed to measure fear of embarrassment
were highly correlated (α = .84) so we averaged them to create a composite measure of
fear of embarrassment. As predicted, participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition
(M = 3.89, SE = 0.15) feared embarrassment more than those in the Control condition (M
= 3.43, SE = 0.14, t(248) = -2.24, p = .026, d = 0.28).4

4

All participant responses were handwritten. A couple participants skipped some questions and others
participants’ answers were illegible. Specifically, two participants did not answer at least one or both of the
manipulation check questions and two participants’ reported number of points were illegible.
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Cheating. Supporting Hypotheses 1, compared to participants in the Control
condition (N = 127), participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition (N = 124) lied
to a greater extent and lied more frequently. We depict these results in Figure 2.
Participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition over reported the number of points
they earned from their dice roll (M = 12.22, SE = 0.36) more than participants in the
Control condition (M = 10.71, SE = 0.20, t(247) = -3.73, p < .001, d = 0.47). Moreover,
the number of participants who misreported their rolls in the Fear of Embarrassment
condition (27%) was approximately 2.5 times greater than the number of participants
who misreported their rolls in the Control Condition (11%, z = -3.23, p = .001, d = 0.42).
Figure 2
Lying to Avoid Embarrassment.

Note: Participants lied to avoid embarrassment. Panel A depicts the average amount of
misreporting across conditions. Panel B depicts the frequency of misreporting across
conditions. Vertical lines represent ±1 standard error. We show the complete histogram
of reports in Figure S2.
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Discussion
In this study, we again find that fear of embarrassment promotes unethical
behavior. Notably, in both Studies 2 and 3, lying was selfish. By advancing their own
interests, participants harmed their peers’ expected outcomes. This finding is consistent
with our survey results in Study 1b; deception motivated by fear of embarrassment can
harm others.
In this study, we also make an important methodological advance in the study of
behavioral ethics. All of the canonical behavioral ethics paradigms use economic
incentives to tempt people to engage in unethical behavior. As our findings in Studies 1a
and 1b reveal, emotions can powerfully motivate people to engage in unethical behavior.
The paradigm we use in this study uses economic incentives to promote ethical behavior.
To our knowledge, this is the first behavioral ethics study to show that people will engage
in unethical behavior to lose money. This is an important step in advancing our
understanding of how important and pervasive non-economic factors are in motivating
unethical behavior.
Study 4: Fifty Shades of Grey
In Studies 2 and 3, we document a causal link between fear of embarrassment and
unethical behavior. In Studies 4 and 5, we extend our investigation to explore potential
mechanisms.
In Study 4, we investigate the potential mediating role of perspective taking to
explain the link between fear of embarrassment and deception. Prior work has shown that
fear of embarrassment can increase self-focused cognition and the tendency to take risks.
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If fear of embarrassment harms the ability of individuals to take others’ perspectives,
individuals may become more likely to engage in self-serving deception because they
focus on the benefits of lying for themselves and neglect the harmful costs of their
behavior to others.
In Study 4, we explore the influence of fear of embarrassment and unethical
behavior in an unobservable online setting. Fear of embarrassment and impression
management concerns are inextricably linked, and we postulate that observability will
moderate the relationship between fear of embarrassment and deception. Specifically, we
consider the possibility that people will lie to avoid embarrassment when their deception
cannot be observed but avoid lying when their deception can be observed. In this study,
we use a large, online sample and conduct preregistered parametric and nonparametric
tests to explore the relationship between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior.
Participants
We recruited 766 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to
participate in a six-minute online survey in exchange for $0.90. We analyze the 616
participants (53% female, Mage = 38.20 years, SD = 12.32) who passed our preregistered
exclusion criteria. This study was preregistered on AsPredicted.org:
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=2ds44w.
Design and Procedure
We informed participants that as part of this study we would ask them to upload
an audio recording of themselves reading a short passage from a novel. We required
participants to correctly answer a question about this instruction to proceed.

31

We then presented participants with images of two books and a 38-40 word
excerpt from each novel. We told participants that we were working on a project that
required many people to read short excerpts from various novels and that the excerpts
below the novel covers were similar to the length and content of the excerpt they would
record and upload (see Appendix A).
We used two different novels in each of the two conditions. In the Fear of
Embarrassment condition (N = 306), participants saw an image of two books: Fifty
Shades of Grey (James, 2012) and A Wrinkle in Time (L’Engle, 1962). Below the Fifty
Shades of Grey cover, participants read the excerpt:
“Very slowly, he pulls down my sweatpants. Oh, how demeaning is this?
Demeaning and scary and hot. He’s making such a meal of this. My heart is in my
mouth. I can barely breathe...is this going to hurt?” (2012, p. 274)
Below the A Wrinkle in Time cover, participants read the excerpt:
“Calvin led Meg across the lawn. The shadows of the trees were long and twisted
and there was a heavy, sweet autumnal smell to the air. Meg stumbled as the land
sloped suddenly downhill, but Calvin’s strong hand steadied her.” (1962, p. 56)
Participants assigned to the Control condition (N = 309) saw two books. One was
exactly the same image and excerpt from a Wrinkle in Time as the one we used in the
Fear of Embarrassment condition. In the Control condition, the second image and excerpt
was from The Phantom Tollbooth (Juster, 1961):
“Up he went-- very quickly at first-then more slowly-- then in a little while even
more slowly than that--and finally, after many minutes of climbing up the endless
stairway, one weary foot was barely able to follow the other.” (1961, p. 193)
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After reading the excerpts, we informed participants that other MTurk workers
would listen to their recordings in a future study and that coin flips would determine
whether they would read excerpts from the first or the second novel. On the following
screen, participants learned that they would earn a $0.10 bonus if they were assigned to
read an excerpt from Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom Tollbooth). That is, in the Fear
of Embarrassment condition, participants would earn more money to read a passage from
the more embarrassing novel.
Participants then answered two items designed to measure perspective taking:
“What is the smallest amount of money you would need to be compensated to volunteer to
read from Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom Tollbooth)?” On the same page, we asked
participants to estimate the smallest amount of money, on average, that other participants
taking the study would need to be paid to volunteer to read Fifty Shades of Grey (The
Phantom Tollbooth). Participants could enter any dollar value they wished for both
questions.
Next, we instructed participants to complete an online version of the Coin Task
(Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). Specifically, we asked participants to find a coin near them
and flip it 10 times. We told participants that the total number of “Heads” they flipped
would determine which book they were assigned to read. We presented participants with
a table that indicated the percent chance they would be assigned to read from Fifty
Shades of Grey (The Phantom Tollbooth) for each number of heads that they flipped. In
this table, participants had 100% chance of reading Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom
Tollbooth) if they flipped zero heads, a 90% chance if they flipped one head, an 80% if
they flipped two heads, etc. The last row of the table showed that participants had a 0%
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chance of being assigned to read Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom Tollbooth) if they
flipped ten heads. Before instructing participants to flip their coin, participants answered
two questions to assess their understanding of these instructions (see Supplementary
Materials for details). Participants who passed the comprehension check were then asked
to flip their coin and indicate the total number of heads that they flipped.
On the next page, participants answered the question: “How concerned are you
that you would feel embarrassed while reading Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom
Tollbooth)?” and answered the same question for A Wrinkle in Time (seven-point Likert
scales, 1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). Finally, we ended the study by informing
participants that the software was unable to generate their passage and that the study
would conclude after they answered demographic questions.
Results
Manipulation check. Participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition feared
embarrassment (M = 3.62, SE = 0.13) more than those in the Control condition (M = 1.86,
SE = 0.09, t(614) = -11.10, p < .0001, d = 0.89).
Lying. Although we cannot link individual behavior with deception in this
paradigm, we build on a substantial body of research that has used statistical inferences to
identify the use of deception across conditions (e.g., Weisel & Shalvi, 2015). In this
study, to assess unethical behavior we compare the number of “Heads” participants
reported across the two conditions.
Supporting Hypotheses 1, participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition
reported that they had flipped a significantly higher number of total heads (M = 5.10, SE
= 0.10) relative to participants in the Control condition (M = 4.67, SE = 0.11, OLS with
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robust standard errors t(614) = 2.90, p = .004, d = 0.23, Mann-Whitney U(N = 616) =
41,119, p = .004). We depict the distribution of reports across conditions in Figure S3.
Self vs. Other Estimates. To investigate the mediating effect of perspective
taking on the link between Fear of Embarrassment and unethical behavior, we examine
each component of our perspective-taking measure separately. In this study, participants
indicated their own willingness to volunteer to read Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom
Tollbooth) and their estimate of others’ willingness to do the same. We preregistered that
we would winsorize both responses at the 95% percentile to account for extreme
responses. On average, participants reported that they would require almost twice as
much compensation to read Fifty Shades of Grey themselves (M = $1.36, SE = 0.12)
compared to how much compensation others would require (M = $0.76, SE = 0.06, t(305)
= 6.09, p <.0001 d = 0.35, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, z=-3.90, p = .001). In the Control
condition, participants’ willingness to record themselves reading the Phantom Tollbooth
(M = $0.68, SE = 0.08) was directionally greater than participants’ estimate of others’
willingness to do the same (M = $0.54, SE = 0.05), but the significance of this effect
depends on the test statistic: t(309) = 2.81, p = .005 , d = 0.16, Wilcoxon signed-rank test,
z = 0.05, p = .960. Using a mixed-effects linear regression, we find a significant
interaction between condition assignment and the gap between participants’ own and
other’s willingness to read the excerpt (B = 0.47, SE = 0.11, p < .001, shown in Fig. 3).
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Figure 3
Fear of embarrassment limits perspective taking.
Figure 3

Note: Participants (N = 616) indicated the smallest amount of money they would need to
be compensated to volunteer to read from Fifty Shades of Grey (The Phantom Tollbooth)
and the smallest amount they believed others would need to volunteer to do the same.
The figure shows the point estimates from a mixed-effects linear regression in which
condition assignment is the between-subjects factor and participants’ answers to each
question is the within-subjects factor. We winsorized both responses at the 95th percentile
prior to running the regression. Vertical lines represent ±1 standard error.
Perspective Taking. Consistent with prior work (Van Boven et al., 2005) and our
preregistration, we derive our measure of perspective taking by subtracting participants’
raw estimate of others’ willingness to accept reading from the Fifty Shades of Grey (The
Phantom Tollbooth) from the amount they needed themselves. We then winsorized this
difference at the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. This difference can be interpreted as the
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amount of money participants need to be compensated over and above the amount that
they think others would need to be compensated for the same activity. We find that
participants’ perspective taking is less accurate when they faced the prospect of
embarrassment (M = $0.84, SE = 0.15) than when they did not (M = $0.17, SE = 0.08,
OLS with robust standard errors t(614) = 3.89, p < .001, d = 0.31, Mann-Whitney U(N =
616) = 42,203, p = .014. See Fig. S4).
To test the mediating effect of perspective taking, we use a structural equation
model in which we simultaneously regress our measure of participants’ perspective
taking and condition assignment on participants’ report and regress participants’
condition assignment on our measure of participants’ perspective taking. The model
reveals a significant indirect effect of perspective taking ([Indirect effect: β = 0.05, CI
[0.002, 0.122], p = .044). However, we generated 95% confidence intervals around the
point estimates of the model using 10,000 bootstrapped resamplings of the model. Using
this nonparametric approach, we find that 13% of the total effect is mediated through
participants’ perspective taking, but that perspective taking in this nonparametric model
does not significantly mediate the relationship between condition assignment and
participants’ report ([Indirect effect: β = 0.05, CI[-0.012, 0.122], p = .107).
Discussion
In Studies 2 and 3, participants were young adults who were part of a community
who completed the study in close physical proximity to each other. These factors increase
the salience of potentially embarrassing experiences (Buss, 1980). Study 4 affords a more
conservative test of our thesis. In this study, we recruited adults across the country to
complete a study in relative anonymity, far apart from each other. Still, as in Studies 2
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and 3, we find that fear of embarrassment promotes unethical behavior. We further find
that fear of embarrassment significantly inhibits perspective taking, and that diminished
perspective taking is linked to both fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior.
Study 5: Stories
In Study 5, we explore how making economic incentives for behavior public
might moderate the relationship between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior.
We expect fear of embarrassment to be diminished when observers can attribute behavior
to contextual factors, such as economic incentives, rather than personal factors. In this
study, we make the incentive system either public or private and randomly assign
participants to one of four conditions from a 2(Fear of Embarrassment vs. Control) X
2(Public Incentive vs. Private Incentive) between-subjects design.
Method
Participants
We recruited 779 participants via MTurk to participate in an eight-minute online
survey in exchange for $1.00. We report analyses for the 622 participants (53% female,
Mage = 39.41 years, SD = 12.58) who passed our preregistered exclusion criteria (See
Table S5). We preregistered this study on AsPredicted.org
(https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=d37kw7).
Design and Procedure
After agreeing to participate, we told participants that they would be paired with
another participant in a chatroom and that they would write several sentences as part of
the study. Participants then passed an attention check that assessed their understanding of
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these instructions and an audio check that ensured participants could play audio files
embedded within the study software.
We then asked participants to recall two events. For the first event, participants
recalled the name of a TV show or movie that they had watched and the month and year
that they watched it. The second event varied by condition. Participants in the Fear of
Embarrassment condition recalled an embarrassing event. Specifically, we asked
participants to recall, “The most embarrassing public gaffes that you may have made a
work, in your romantic life, or in your ordinary interactions with strangers.” We asked
participants to indicate where this event occurred and the month and year that it
happened. Participants in the Control condition indicated the name of a website that they
had recently visited and the month and year that they visited it.
Across conditions, participants then listened to a recording of a narrator reading
the next set of instructions. Participants learned that they would be paired with another
participant taking this study and that one participant would be assigned Role A and the
other would be assigned to Role B. If assigned to Role A, participants would write about
the TV show or movie that they indicated on the previous page. The description of Role
B varied across conditions. Participants in the Fear of Embarrassment condition learned:
If you are assigned to Role B you will write a detailed description of your
embarrassing experience that you identified on the previous page. In your
description you will state how mortified you felt and how awkward the situation
was. You should also describe who witnessed your embarrassment and describe
how they reacted to your social discomfort.
Participants in the Control condition learned:
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If you are assigned to Role B you will write a detailed description of the website
you identified on the previous page. In your description you will describe the
purpose of the website and the content it provides.
We told participants that they would write four sentences about their event
regardless of their role and that they would be placed in a chatroom to share what they
had written with their partner. Before proceeding, participants answered two questions to
ensure that they understood these instructions.
On the next page, participants listened to a second set of audio instructions. The
narrator informed participants that they were assigned to Role B but that they could
switch to Role A before the interaction task with their partner. We told participants that
they would participate in a coin flipping task, that they would receive 1 point each time
they flipped “Heads,” and that if they were in the top 25% of point holders taking the
study, they would be reassigned to Role A. Participants then answered three
comprehension-check questions to ensure that they understood this information.
Public vs. Private Incentives. On the next page, we told participants that they
would earn a $0.10 bonus if they remained assigned to Role B. We also told participants
that we would send a message to their partner before the interaction task. Participants in
the Public Incentive conditions learned that their counterpart would read: “We provided
your partner with a large bonus if they remained assigned to Role B. They will share
their embarrassing experience (description of a website) with you on the next page.”
Participants in the Private Incentive conditions learned that their counterpart would read:
“Your partner chose to share their embarrassing experience (description of a website)
with you on the next page.”
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The Coin Task. After reading this message, participants proceeded to complete the
Coin Task. As in Study 4, we asked participants to find a coin and flip it 10 times. In this
study, however, we did not provide participants with a table of possible outcomes.
Instead, we told participants that they earned one point each time they flipped Heads. We
reminded participants that if they were in the top 25% of point holders after 10 flips, they
would be reassigned to Role A. Participants then reported the number of Heads that they
had flipped.
On the next page, participants answered the question: “How concerned are you
that you would feel embarrassed if you remained assigned to Role B?” and answered a
similar question if they were reassigned to Role A (1 = Not at all, 7 = Very Much). To
conclude the study, we informed participants that the experimenters were unable to match
the participant with a counterpart and asked them to answer demographic questions.
Results
Manipulation check. Participants in the Fear of Embarrassment conditions feared
embarrassment more if they were assigned to Role B (M = 3.32, SE = 0.12) than did
those in the Control conditions (M = 1.68, SE = 0.08 , t(620) = 11.81, p < .001, d = 0.95).
Lying. As we found in Studies 2, 3, and 4, fear of embarrassment promoted
unethical behavior. Participants assigned to the Fear of Embarrassment conditions (N =
294) lied to a great extent than those in the Control conditions (N = 328). Participants in
the Fear of Embarrassment conditions reported flipping a significantly higher number of
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heads (M = 5.46, SE = 0.11) than did those in the Control conditions (M = 4.69, SE =
0.11, t(620) = 5.03, p < .001, d = 0.40, Mann-Whitney U(N = 622) = 36,760, p <.001).5
Knowledge of incentives. To investigate the moderating effect of audience
knowledge (Hypothesis 2), we ran an OLS regression with robust standard errors on
participants’ reports using the interaction between the two between-subjects factors and
each factor separately as predictor variables. As depicted in Figure 3, the interaction term
was directional but nonsignificant (B = -0.44, SE = 0.31 p = .151). However, we find
some support for our theorizing. When participants knew that their incentive was public
knowledge (N = 149), they cheated less (M = 5.27, SE = 0.15) than when they believed
their audience was unaware (N = 145) of their economic incentive (M = 5.68, SE = 0.16,
t(292) = -2.06, p = .040, d = 0.24, Mann-Whitney U(N = 294) = 9,317, p =.039). As
expected, we found no effect for public knowledge of the incentive in the Control
condition (Public Incentive (N = 160): M = 4.68 SE = 0.16, Private Incentive (N = 168):
M = 4.69, SE = 0.14, ps>.9).

5

Twenty-three participants reported flipping ten heads, 14 of which were in the Fear of Embarrassment
conditions. The difference of proportions across conditions was directional but nonsignificant (p = .183).
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Figure 4
Moderation effect of audience knowledge on fear of embarrassment and unethical
behavior
Figure 4

Note: Individuals lied to avoid embarrassment, especially when they thought observers
would not know that they were paid a bonus payment to do so. Vertical lines represent ±1
standard error.
Discussion
We again document a robust relationship between fear of embarrassment and
unethical behavior. We used novel methods to induce fear of embarrassment and find that
people were significantly more likely to misreport their performance when they faced the
prospect of an embarrassing experience.
In this study, we also explore a potential moderating mechanism to account for
the relationship between fear of embarrassment and unethical behavior. Specifically, we
consider how public versus private knowledge about an ulterior (e.g., economic) motive
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for engaging in embarrassing behavior may influence the concern individuals experience
about the prospect of engaging in that behavior.
General Discussion
For decades, scholars have asserted that fear of embarrassment is a “desirable
agent of social control…encouraging each of us to be steadfastly moral and respectable”
(R. S. Miller, 1996, p. 164). Inspired by this conceptualization, leading scholars have
asserted that fear of embarrassment promotes adherence to social norms and ethical
behavior (C. Clark, 1990; Gibbons, 1990; Goffman, 1956; Keltner & Haidt, 1999;
Kemper, 1993; Leary & Kowalski, 1995; Lieberman, Duke, & Amir, 2019; Schlenker &
Leary, 1982). Our findings challenge this conceptualization. For the first time, we show
that fear of embarrassment, rather than promoting “steadfastly moral and respectable”
behavior, can promote unethical behavior.
Across four experiments, we document a robust relationship between fear of
embarrassment and deception. In Study 2, we find that fear of embarrassment in a
miming task motivates individuals to lie about their anagram performance. In Studies 3,
4, and 5, we show that fear of embarrassment motivates participants to lie even when we
gave participants an economic incentive for behaving ethically. Interestingly, in Studies 2
and 3, when individuals engaged in deception, they harmed others by increasing other
participants’ likelihood of being embarrassed. These findings in particular challenge the
prevailing assertion about that fear of embarrassment promotes socially desirable
behavior.
Our findings also demonstrate that fear of embarrassment is a pervasive
workplace emotion. Across the two surveys in Study 1, we find that most employees both
44

experienced and feared the experience of embarrassment. In addition, consistent with our
experiments, half of respondents report that they had engaged in deception to avoid being
embarrassed at work. In many of the cases respondents described, the actions they took to
avoid embarrassment harmed the organization. Our findings not only identify an
important antecedent of unethical behavior, but also may in fact identify one of the most
common reasons for why people lie.
Our findings make several important theoretical contributions. First, our work
advances our understanding of embarrassment and social conformity. Specifically, we
show that when individuals are unable to avoid embarrassment through conformity, they
may engage in unethical behavior.
A few scholars have considered the possibility that fear of embarrassment may
not promote desirable organizational behavior. These scholars, however, have completely
overlooked the possibility that fear of embarrassment might promote unethical behavior.
Instead, this work has focused on how high levels of fear of embarrassment might harm
organizations by limiting employee voice (Morrison, 2014; Morrison & Milliken, 2000)
and participation (Edmondson, 1999).
Our findings make important contributions to ethical decision making scholarship.
By studying the link between embarrassment and unethical behavior, our findings deepen
our understanding of the influence of affect as an antecedent to unethical behavior, and
answers an explicit call for work in this area (Avramova & Inbar, 2013). In addition, our
work underscores the importance of psychological protection in motivating unethical
behavior. Not only did participants in our studies not face an economic incentive to
engage in deception, but they also could have earned more money by not engaging in
45

deception. Our experimental paradigms offer new approaches for studying unethical
behavior and challenge the ubiquitous use of economic incentives to tempt participants to
engage in unethical behavior. Existing behavioral ethics research has employed
paradigms that implicitly assume that the primary (or sole) reason people engage in
unethical behavior is for additional economic rewards. Our findings and experimental
paradigms underscore an important fact: people routinely engage in unethical behavior
for reasons that have nothing to do with economic incentives.
Our investigation also makes an additional methodological contribution. The diein-cup task is one of the most popular tasks for studying deception (Gächter & Schulz,
2016; Gerlach et al., 2019; Maréchal, Cohn, Ugazio, & Ruff, 2017; Shalvi et al., 2011). It
is simple to implement and it affords participants a strong sense of anonymity. Moreover,
scholars have found that lying in this paradigm correlates with workplace behaviors, such
as unexcused absenteeism (Hanna & Wang, 2017), not paying for public transportation
(Dai, Galeotti, & Villeval, 2017), and keeping undeserved pay (Potters & Stoop, 2016).
However, a major drawback of the die-in-cup paradigm is that it limits researchers’
understanding of individual decision making. Scholars using the die-in-cup paradigm
have had to rely on statistical inference to identify unethical behavior, because
researchers cannot identify deception at the individual level. We introduce a new
paradigm, the Odd-Even Dice Task, which retains the simplicity and sense of anonymity
of the die-in-cup task but enables researchers to measure deception at the individual level.
Our paradigm offers scholars a powerful tool to link manipulations and situational
variables with individual behavior.
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We also make two methodological contributions to the discrete emotions
literature. First, prior work has employed a fairly limited set of fear of embarrassment
inductions. In our investigation, we introduce three face-valid designs to induce fear of
embarrassment. All three inductions evoke a loss of social control and failure of privacy
regulation (Keltner & Buswell, 1997), core features of embarrassment.
In our investigation, we also expand our understanding of anticipatory emotions.
Prior experimental work has largely focused on incidental emotions because they have
been conceptualized as conservative tests of the way emotions influence decision making
(Gino & Schweitzer, 2008). This focus, however, has limited our understanding of how
emotions influence behavior. Neuroscientists, for example, have found that anticipatory
emotions are essential for functional social interactions (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio,
2000; Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003). The exclusive focus on how
individuals react to the presence of stimuli after experiencing an emotion, and the
disregard for the emotions that guide individuals to choose or avoid those stimuli in the
first place has limited our understanding about how emotions affect behavior. Our work
begins to address this shortcoming by treating fear of embarrassment as an integral, rather
than incidental emotion. This line of inquiry, however, is far from complete. The
behavioral consequences of anticipatory regret, guilt, shame, happiness, and anger have
all received slight attention—and certainly far less attention than the behavioral
consequences following the experience of these emotions. We call for future work to
focus on how anticipatory emotions guide behavior.
In addition to theoretical and methodological contributions, our findings inform
management practice. Leading managers and scholars have advocated for greater candid
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and critical feedback to promote learning and development (Dalio, 2017; Levine &
Cohen, 2018; Rosen & Tesser, 1970). Our findings suggest that managers should
implement these systems with caution and be particularly mindful of the embarrassment
these systems can create. Our findings reveal that fear of embarrassment is pervasive in
the workplace and that these feelings can promote unproductive and harmful
organizational behaviors. Guided by our findings, we call for managers to be mindful of
the prevalence of embarrassment and fear of embarrassment in the workplace. Managers
may be able to curb fear of embarrassment in their workplace by limiting experiences that
are highly evaluative, unfamiliar, and that include large audiences with high status
members (Hershcovis, Ogunfowora, Reich, & Christie, 2017; Keltner & Buswell, 1996,
1997; R. S. Miller, 1992; R. S. Miller & Tangney, 1994; Parrott & Smith, 1991; Tangney
et al., 1996). At the same time, we call for managers to be especially vigilant for
unethical behavior in settings like these that are likely to promote fear of embarrassment.
In our work, we focused on the relationship between fear of embarrassment and
unethical behavior. Our findings challenge prior work that has characterized fear of
embarrassment as a force for promoting social cohesion and order. We note, however,
that important features of our studies, such as the opportunities to engage in unethical
behavior, enabled us to identify this relationship. In very different settings, we believe
that fear of embarrassment can promote conformity and avoidance, just as prior scholars
have asserted (Asch, 1956; Latané & Darley, 1968). We call for future work to extend
our investigation to study contextual factors that moderate the influence of fear of
embarrassment on organizational behavior.
Conclusion
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Prior work has conceptualized fear of embarrassment as a force that promotes
ethical behavior and social order. Gibbons (1990, p. 138) asserts that without “fear of
embarrassment… there would be social anarchy.” We challenge this assertion and show
that fear of embarrassment can promote self-serving, unethical behavior. In addition, we
are the first to document the prevalence of fear of embarrassment in the workplace and
reveal that fear of embarrassment can drive employees to engage in behaviors that harm
organizations. Quite possibly, by diminishing fear of embarrassment we can make our
organizations more inclusive, more effective, and more ethical.

49

References
Abeler, J., Nosenzo, D., & Raymond, C. (2019). Preferences for Truth-Telling.
Econometrica, 87(4), 1115–1153. https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA14673
Asch, S. E. (1956). Studies of independence and conformity: I. A minority of one against
a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 70, 1–
70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0093718
Associated Press. (2008, November 27). Eau Claire criminal spends holiday holding ‘I
was stupid’ sign. Twin Cities. Retrieved from
https://www.twincities.com/2008/11/27/eau-claire-criminal-spends-holidayholding-i-was-stupid-sign/
Associated Press. (2009, November 3). Pa. Mom, daughter admit stealing from girl, 9.
NBC News. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/33606449/ns/us_newsweird_news/t/pa-mom-daughter-admit-stealing-girl/
Avramova, Y. R., & Inbar, Y. (2013). Emotion and moral judgment. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 4, 169–178.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/wcs.1216
Barkan, R., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2015). Ethical dissonance, justifications, and moral
behavior. Current Opinion in Psychology, 6, 157–161.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.08.001
Baron, J. (1992). The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 320–330. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00223514.63.2.320

50

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., Nathan DeWall, C., & Zhang, L. (2007). How emotion
shapes behavior: Feedback, anticipation, and reflection, rather than direct
causation. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 11, 167–203.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868307301033
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Emotion, Decision Making and the
Orbitofrontal Cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 10(3), 295–307.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/10.3.295
Beer, J. S., Heerey, E. A., Keltner, D., Scabini, D., & Knight, R. T. (2003). The
regulatory function of self-conscious emotion: Insights from patients with
orbitofrontal damage. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85(4), 594.
Blair, S., & Roese, N. J. (2013). Balancing the Basket: The Role of Shopping Basket
Composition in Embarrassment. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(4), 676–691.
https://doi.org/10.1086/671761
Borger, J., & Jackson, J. (2008, June 16). Could humiliation be the next weapon in our
war on crime? The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2008/jun/17/prisonsandprobation.internatio
nalcrime
Brown, B. R. (1970). Face-saving following experimentally induced embarrassment.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 255–271.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(70)90061-2
Buss, A. H. (1980). Self-consciousness and social anxiety. San Francisco: Freeman.
Chandler, S. (2019, August 18). Increasing Police Use Of Social Media Shaming Carries
Grave Privacy Risks. Forbes. Retrieved from
51

https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonchandler/2019/08/18/increasing-police-useof-social-media-shaming-carries-grave-privacy-risks/
Choshen-Hillel, S., Shaw, A., & Caruso, E. M. (2020). Lying to appear honest. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 149(9), 1719–1735.
https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000737
Clark, C. (1990). Emotions and micropolitics in everyday life: Some patterns and
paradoxes of “place.” In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), Research agendas in the sociology
of emotions (pp. 305–333). Albany: State University of New York Press.
Consedine, N. S., & Moskowitz, J. T. (2007). The role of discrete emotions in health
outcomes: A critical review. Applied and Preventive Psychology, 12, 59–75.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appsy.2007.09.001
Courneya, K. S., & Hellsten, L.-A. M. (1998). Personality correlates of exercise behavior,
motives, barriers and preferences: An application of the five-factor model.
Personality and Individual Differences, 24, 625–633.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(97)00231-6
Crozier, W. R. (1990). Introduction. In W. R. Crozier (Ed.), Shyness and embarrassment:
Perspectives from social psychology. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University
Press.
Cupach, W. R., & Metts, S. (1992). The effects of type of predicament and
embarrassability on remedial responses to embarrassing situations.
Communication Quarterly, 40(2), 149–161.
https://doi.org/10.1080/01463379209369830

52

Dahl, D. W., Manchanda, R. V., & Argo, J. J. (2001). Embarrassment in consumer
purchase: The roles of social presence and purchase familiarity. Journal of
Consumer Research, 28, 473–481. https://dx.doi.org/10.1086/323734
Dai, Z., Galeotti, F., & Villeval, M. C. (2017). Cheating in the lab predicts fraud in the
field: An experiment in public transportation. Management Science, 64, 1081–
1100. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2616
Dalio, R. (2017). Principles. New York: Simon and Schuster.
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996).
Lying in everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 979–
995. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.979
Derfler-Rozin, R., Pillutla, M., & Thau, S. (2010). Social reconnection revisited: The
effects of social exclusion risk on reciprocity, trust, and general risk-taking.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 112(2), 140–150.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.02.005
Donaldson, S. (2019). Cleveland woman holding “idiot” sign only the latest oddball
sentences from Northeast Ohio judges (gallery)—Cleveland.com. Cleveland.Com.
Retrieved from
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2012/11/cleveland_woman_holding_idiot.html
Edelmann, R. J. (1987). The psychology of embarrassment. Chichester, England: Wiley.
Edmondson, A. (1999). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 350–383.
https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2666999

53

Edwards, D. J. (1975). Returning a dropped object: Effect of response cost and number of
potential helpers. The Journal of Social Psychology, 97, 169–171.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1975.9923336
Evans, J. St. B. T. (2008). Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social
Cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 59(1), 255–278.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629
Feldman, D. C. (1984). The development and enforcement of group norms. Academy of
Management Review, 9, 47–53. https://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.1984.4277934
Fineman, S. (1996). Emotion and Organizing. In S. R. Clegg, C. Hardy, & W. R. Nord
(Eds.), Handbook of Organization Studies (pp. 543–564). London: Sage.
Gächter, S., & Schulz, J. F. (2016). Intrinsic honesty and the prevalence of rule violations
across societies. Nature, 531, 496–499. https://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature17160
Gerlach, P., Teodorescu, K., & Hertwig, R. (2019). The truth about lies: A meta-analysis
on dishonest behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 145(1), 1–44.
https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000174
Gibbons, F. X. (1990). The impact of focus of attention and affect on social behaviour. In
W. R. Crozier (Ed.), Shyness and embarrassment: Perspectives from social
psychology (pp. 119–143). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Gino, F., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2008). Blinded by anger or feeling the love: How
emotions influence advice taking. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93(5), 1165–
1173. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.93.5.1165

54

Gino, F., & Wiltermuth, S. S. (2014). Evil genius? How dishonesty can lead to greater
creativity. Psychological Science, 25(4), 973–981.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797614520714
Gneezy, U., Kajackaite, A., & Sobel, J. (2018). Lying aversion and the size of the lie.
American Economic Review, 108, 419–453.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161553
Goffman, E. (1956). Embarrassment and social organization. American Journal of
Sociology, 62, 264–271. https://dx.doi.org/10.1086/222003
Goffman, E. (1967). On face-work. In E. Goffman (Ed.), Interaction ritual: Essays on
face-to-face behavior (pp. 5–45). New York, NY: Anchor Books.
Grant, A. M., & Wrzesniewski, A. (2010). I won’t let you down… or will I? Core selfevaluations, other-orientation, anticipated guilt and gratitude, and job
performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 108–121.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017974
Gunia, B. C., & Levine, E. E. (2019). Deception as competence: The effect of
occupational stereotypes on the perception and proliferation of deception.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 152, 122–137.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2019.02.003
Hanna, R., & Wang, S.-Y. (2017). Dishonesty and selection into public service: Evidence
from India. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 9, 262–290.
https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150029

55

Harré, R. (1990). Embarrassment: A conceptual analysis. In W. R. Crozier (Ed.), Shyness
and embarrassment: Perspectives from social psychology (pp. 181–204).
Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Heath, C., & Sitkin, S. B. (2001). Big‐B versus big‐O: What is organizational about
organizational behavior? Journal of Organizational Behavior, 22, 43–58.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/job.77
Herold, E. S. (1981). Contraceptive embarrassment and contraceptive behavior among
young single women. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 10, 233–242. https://dx.
doi.org/10.1007/BF02088973
Hershcovis, M. S., Ogunfowora, B., Reich, T. C., & Christie, A. M. (2017). Targeted
workplace incivility: The roles of belongingness, embarrassment, and power.
Journal of Organizational Behavior, 38, 1057–1075.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/job.2183
James, E. L. (2012). Fifty Shades of Grey. London: Random House.
Juster, N. (1961). The Phantom Tollbooth. New York: Scholastic.
Kashy, D. A., & DePaulo, B. M. (1996). Who lies? Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 70(5), 1037–1051. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.5.1037
Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1996). Evidence for the distinctness of embarrassment,
shame, and guilt: A study of recalled antecedents and facial expressions of
emotion. Cognition & Emotion, 10, 155–172.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999396380312

56

Keltner, D., & Buswell, B. N. (1997). Embarrassment: Its distinct form and appeasement
functions. Psychological Bulletin, 122, 250–270. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00332909.122.3.250
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (1999). Social functions of emotions at four levels of analysis.
Cognition & Emotion, 13, 505–521. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/026999399379168
Keltner, D., & Haidt, J. (2001). Social functions of emotions.
Kemper, T. D. (1993). Sociological models in the explanation of emotions. In M. Lewis
& J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 41–51). New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Kouchaki, M., & Desai, S. D. (2015). Anxious, threatened, and also unethical: How
anxiety makes individuals feel threatened and commit unethical acts. Journal of
Applied Psychology, 100, 360–375. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0037796
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1968). Group inhibition of bystander intervention in
emergencies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 10, 215–221.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0026570
Latané, B., & Darley, J. M. (1970). The unresponsive bystander: Why doesn’t he help?
New York, NY: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Leary, M. R., & Kowalski, R. M. (1995). Social anxiety. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Leary, M. R., Tchividijian, L. R., & Kraxberger, B. E. (1994). Self-presentation can be
hazardous to your health: Impression management and health risk. Health
Psychology, 13, 461–470. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-6133.13.6.461

57

Leavitt, K., & Sluss, D. M. (2015). Lying for who we are: An identity-based model of
workplace dishonesty. Academy of Management Review, 40(4), 587–610.
https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2013.0167
Leenaars, P., Rombouts, R., & Kok, G. (1993). Seeking medical care for a sexually
transmitted disease: Determinants of delay-behavior. Psychology and Health, 8,
17–32. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08870449308403164
Leith, K. P., & Baumeister, R. F. (1996). Why do bad moods increase self-defeating
behavior? Emotion, risk tasking, and self-regulation. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 71, 1250–1267. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00223514.71.6.1250
L’Engle, M. (1962). A Wrinkle in Time. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., & Kassam, K. S. (2015). Emotion and decision
making. Annual Review of Psychology, 66(1), 799–823.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115043
Levine, E. E., & Cohen, T. R. (2018). You can handle the truth: Mispredicting the
consequences of honest communication. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 147(9), 1400. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000488
Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2015). Prosocial lies: When deception breeds trust.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 126, 88–106.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.10.007
Lewis, M. (1993). Self-conscious emotions: Embarrassment, pride, shame, and guilt. In
M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 563–573). New
York, NY: Guilford Press.
58

Lewittes, D. J., & Simmons, W. L. (1975). Impression management of sexually
motivated behavior. The Journal of Social Psychology, 96(1), 39–44.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1975.9923260
Lieberman, A., Duke, K. E., & Amir, O. (2019). How incentive framing can harness the
power of social norms. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,
151, 118–131. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.001
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as feelings.
Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267–286. https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/00332909.127.2.267
Maréchal, M. A., Cohn, A., Ugazio, G., & Ruff, C. C. (2017). Increasing honesty in
humans with noninvasive brain stimulation. Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences, 114, 4360–4364. https://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1614912114
Martinez, A. G., Stuewig, J., & Tangney, J. P. (2014). Can perspective-taking reduce
crime? Examining a pathway through empathic-concern and guilt-proneness.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(12), 1659–1667.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214554915
Mazar, N., Amir, O., & Ariely, D. (2008). The dishonesty of honest people: A theory of
self-concept maintenance. Journal of Marketing Research, 45, 633–644.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.45.6.633
McDonald, J., & McKelvie, S. J. (1992). Playing safe: Helping rates for a dropped mitten
and a box of condoms. Psychological Reports, 71, 113–114.
https://dx.doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1992.71.1.113

59

Mellers, B. A., & McGraw, A. P. (2001). Anticipated emotions as guides to choice.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 210–214.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00151
Metts, S., & Cupach, W. R. (1989). Situational influence on the use of remedial strategies
in embarrassing predicaments. Communications Monographs, 56(2), 151–162.
https://doi.org/10.1080/03637758909390256
Miller, D. T., & McFarland, C. (1987). Pluralistic ignorance: When similarity is
interpreted as dissimilarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53,
298–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.53.2.298
Miller, R. S. (1992). The nature and severity of self-reported embarrassing circumstances.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 190–198.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167292182010
Miller, R. S. (1996). Embarrassment: Poise and peril in everyday life. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Miller, R. S., & Leary, M. R. (1992). Social sources and interactive functions of emotion:
The case of embarrassment. In M. Clark (Ed.), Review of personality and social
psychology: Vol. 14 Emotion and social behavior (pp. 202–221). Newbury Park,
CA: Sage.
Miller, R. S., & Tangney, J. (1994). Differentiating embarrassment and shame. Journal of
Social and Clinical Psychology, 13, 273–287.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1521/jscp.1994.13.3.273

60

Moran, S., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2008). When better is worse: Envy and the use of
deception. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 1, 3–29.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-4716.2007.00002.x
Morrison, E. W. (2014). Employee voice and silence. Annual Review of Organizational
Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 1, 173–197.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-031413-091328
Morrison, E. W., & Milliken, F. J. (2000). Organizational silence: A barrier to change
and development in a pluralistic world. The Academy of Management Review, 25,
706–725. https://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amr.2000.3707697
O’Reilly, C. A., & Doerr, B. (2020). Conceit and deceit: Lying, cheating, and stealing
among grandiose narcissists. Personality and Individual Differences, 154,
109627. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109627
Parrott, W. G., & Smith, S. F. (1991). Embarrassment: Actual vs. Typical cases, classical
vs. Prototypical representations. Cognition & Emotion, 5, 467–488.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699939108411053
Potters, J., & Stoop, J. (2016). Do cheaters in the lab also cheat in the field? European
Economic Review, 87, 26–33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.03.004
Prentice, D. A., & Miller, D. T. (1996). Pluralistic ignorance and the perpetuation of
social norms by unwitting actors. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,
28, 161–209.
Reutter, D. (2015, February 4). For Shame! Public Shaming Sentences on the Rise |
Prison Legal News. Retrieved August 7, 2020, from Prison Legal News website:

61

https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/feb/4/shame-public-shamingsentences-rise/
Rosen, S., & Tesser, A. (1970). On reluctance to communicate undesirable information:
The MUM effect. Sociometry, 33, 253–263. https://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2786156
Ruedy, N. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2010). In the moment: The effect of mindfulness on
ethical decision making. Journal of Business Ethics, 95, 73–87.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0796-y
Sabini, J., Siepmann, M., & Stein, J. (2001). The really fundamental attribution error in
social psychological research. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 1–15.
https://dx.abdoi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1201_01
Sabini, J., & Silver, M. (2005). Lack of character? Situationism critiqued. Ethics, 115,
535–562. https://dx.doi.org/10.1086/428459
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). In Impression management: The self-concept, social identity,
and interpersonal relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A
conceptualization model. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 641–669.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.92.3.641
Schlenker, B. R., & Pontari, B. A. (2000). The strategic control of information:
Impression management and self-presentation in daily life. In Psychological
perspectives on self and identity (pp. 199–232). Washington, DC, US: American
Psychological Association. https://doi.org/10.1037/10357-008

62

Schlösser, T., Dunning, D., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2013). What a feeling: The role of
immediate and anticipated emotions in risky decisions. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 26, 13–30. https://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bdm.757
Serota, K. B., Levine, T. R., & Boster, F. J. (2010). The Prevalence of Lying in America:
Three Studies of Self-Reported Lies. Human Communication Research, 36(1), 2–
25. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2958.2009.01366.x
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011). Justified ethicality:
Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181–190.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.02.001
Sharkey, W. F., & Stafford, L. (1990). Responses to embarrassment. Human
Communication Research, 17(2), 315–342.
Shteir, R. (2006, August 7). The shame of America. The Guardian. Retrieved from
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/08/comment.usa
Smith-Crowe, K., & Warren, D. E. (2014). The emotion-evoked collective corruption
model: The role of emotion in the spread of corruption within organizations.
Organization Science, 25, 1154–1171. https://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0896
Soraperra, I., Weisel, O., Zultan, R., Kochavi, S., Leib, M., Shalev, H., & Shalvi, S.
(2017). The bad consequences of teamwork. Economics Letters, 160, 12–15.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.08.011
Stonehouse, C. M., & Miller, R. S. (1994, July). Embarrassing circumstances, week by
week. Presented at the Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American
Psychological Society, Washington, DC.
63

Tangney, J. P., Mashek, D. J., & Stuewig, J. (2005). Shame, guilt, and embarrassment:
Will the real emotion please stand up? Psychological Inquiry, 16, 44–48.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli1601_02
Tangney, J. P., Miller, R. S., Flicker, L., & Barlow, D. H. (1996). Are shame, guilt, and
embarrassment distinct emotions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
70, 1256–1269. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.6.1256
Tangney, J. P., Stuewig, J., & Mashek, D. J. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior.
Annual Review of Psychology, 58, 345–372.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070145
Teichman, Y. (1973). Emotional arousal and affiliation. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 9, 591–605. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(73)90040-1
Tenbrunsel, A. E. (1998). Misrepresentation and expectations of misrepresentation in an
ethical dilemma: The role of incentives and temptation. Academy of Management
Journal, 41(3), 330–339.
Tourangeau, R., & Yan, T. (2007). Sensitive questions in surveys. Psychological
Bulletin, 133, 859–883. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859
Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A
theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 103–125.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli1502_01
Tracy, J. L., Robins, R. W., & Tangney, J. P. (2007). The self-conscious emotions:
Theory and research. New York, NY: Guilford Press.
Van Boven, L., Loewenstein, G., & Dunning, D. (2005). The illusion of courage in social
predictions: Underestimating the impact of fear of embarrassment on other
64

people. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96, 130–141.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.12.001
Van Boven, L., Loewenstein, G., Welch, E., & Dunning, D. (2012). The illusion of
courage in self‐predictions: Mispredicting one’s own behavior in embarrassing
situations. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 25(1), 1–12.
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.706
Van der Schalk, J., Kuppens, T., Bruder, M., & Manstead, A. S. (2015). The social power
of regret: The effect of social appraisal and anticipated emotions on fair and
unfair allocations in resource dilemmas. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 144, 151–157. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/xge0000036
Warren, D. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2018). When lying does not pay: How experts detect
insurance fraud. Journal of Business Ethics, 150, 711–726.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3124-8
Warren, D. E., & Smith-Crowe, K. (2008). Deciding what’s right: The role of external
sanctions and embarrassment in shaping moral judgments in the workplace.
Research in Organizational Behavior, 28, 81–105.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.riob.2008.04.004
Weisel, O., & Shalvi, S. (2015). The collaborative roots of corruption. Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 112, 10651–10656.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1423035112
Wiltermuth, S. S. (2011). Cheating more when the spoils are split. Organizational
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 157–168.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.10.001
65

Wong, K. F. E., & Kwong, J. Y. Y. (2007). The role of anticipated regret in escalation of
commitment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 545–554.
https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.2.545
Yip, J. A., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2016). Mad and misleading: Incidental anger promotes
deception. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 137, 207–
217. https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.09.006
Yip, J. A., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2019). Losing your temper and your perspective: Anger
reduces perspective-taking. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 150, 28–45. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.07.003
Zhong, C. B. (2011). The ethical dangers of deliberative decision making. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 56, 1–25. https://dx.doi.org/10.2189/asqu.2011.56.1.001

66

APPENDIX A
Materials for Study 2
Upon instruction, participants broke the seal and opened a manila folder to complete Task
1 (See Panel A). The Task 1 worksheet was stapled to the manila folder with a single
staple on the top. After three minutes, participants were instructed to stop work, tear off
the top sheet and answer two questions on the back of the page (see Panel B). A yellow
sheet that was titled “Task 2” was stapled in four corners. Unbeknownst to participants, a
sheet of carbon paper was stapled underneath the yellow sheet of paper.
Panel A
Panel B

After three minutes, we collected participants’ manila folders and handed them a packet
labeled Task 2. The Task 2 packet varied by condition. The Task 2 packet in the Fear of
Embarrassment condition included the following pages:
Page 1
Page 2
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Page 3

Page 4

The experimenter read Page 2 of the Task 2 packet aloud. After reading these
instructions, participants self-graded their performance on Task 1. The experimenter then
collected the Task 1 worksheet, conducted the lottery, and called two participants to the
front of the room. While these participants performed their mimes, all other participants
in the Fear of Embarrassment condition filled out Page 3. (See the Supplementary
Materials for copies of the Task 1 worksheet, the Task 2 packet used in the Control
condition, and the questionnaire participants completed after the performances.)
Measure of Cheating. We assessed cheating by comparing the number of anagrams that
participants correctly solved on the carbon paper to the number of anagrams participants
reported after self-scoring their performance. Below we show an example of a
participant’s Task 1 worksheet and carbon paper. This participant overreported their
performance by two anagrams. (We redact the participant’s laboratory ID to preserve
anonymity.)
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Materials for Study 3
Below is a photo of the table that participants walked by before sitting at their cubicle in
the Fear of Embarrassment and Control conditions.
Fear of Embarrassment Condition

Control Condition
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The Odd-Even Dice Task.
Below is a picture of a Fair Die, an Odd Die and an Even Die. In a normal die-in-cup
task, participants are given one or two Fair Die. In the Odd-Even Dice Task participants
are given one Odd Die and one Even Die.
Fair Die

Odd Dice

Even Die
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Participants roll their dice together and use the Dice Scoring Table below to report the
number of points they earned from their roll. Note that with the Odd and Even dice,
participants’ rolls always sum to an odd number and always yield 10 points.
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Materials for Study 4
Novel covers and passages shown to participants in the Fear of
Embarrassment Condition.

Novel covers and passages shown to participants in the Control
Condition.
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CHAPTER 2
SHAME BROADCASTS SOCIAL NORMS:
THE POSITIVE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF SHAME ON NORM ACQUISITION AND
NORMATIVE BEHAVIOR
Rebecca L. Schaumberg
Samuel E. Skowronek

Forthcoming in Psychological Science
How does shame affect social cohesion? Prior work has drawn divergent conclusions to
this question because shame can spur maladaptive behaviors for those who experience it.
However, past work has overlooked the interindividual effects of shame –how one’s
expression of shame affects those who witness it. We investigate these social learning
effects of shame and identify norm transmission as a reliable route by which shame
facilitates social cohesion. Across five studies and two supplemental studies with U.S.based participants (N = 3,726), we manipulate whether someone conveys shame, no
specific emotion, or other discrete emotions to their behavior. We then assess the effect
on participants’ norm inferences and norm conforming behavior. We find that shame
broadcasts particularly strong signals about social norms, and people adjust their behavior
to align with these norms. We discuss how these findings challenge common conclusions
about shame and generate insights about shame’s influence on social life.
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Introduction
Shame occupies an increasingly prominent place in public discourse.6 Popular
press writings decry the consequences of a growing shamelessness in society, as well as
the futility of shame for fostering social cohesion (Bruni, 2018; Goldberg, 2020). Group
life depends on social cohesion or people adhering to shared standards to guide their
behavior and relationships (Friedkin, 2004; Hogg, 1992). With growing public concern
about both shamelessness and shaming (Bruni, 2018; Goldberg, 2020), understanding
whether and how shame facilitates social cohesion is theoretically and practically
important.
Shame is a negative, self-conscious emotion that arises from social relationships
in which people evaluate and negatively judge themselves from the perspective of others
(Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 2014). Shame signals a painful discrepancy between one's actual
self and one's ideal self and signals a threat of social devaluation (Sznycer et al., 2016;
Tangney et al., 1998).
Prior work has debated whether or how shame affects social cohesion. In the
present work, we broaden the investigation of shame from the effects of personally
feeling ashamed to the consequences of learning about others’ feelings of shame.
Specifically, we test two primary predictions. One, shame expressions facilitate norm
acquisition—people infer the content of group norms from other people's shame
expressions. Two, shame expressions engender norm conformity in others—people are

6

A NexisUni search showed that 20% of articles published about shame in the New York Times from
1980-2020 have been published in the past three years.
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more likely to conform with inferred social norms after witnessing someone express
shame.
We base these predictions on the following observations. One, people follow
normative standards because failing to do so risks social censure and devaluation (Boyd
& Richerson, 2009; Dannals & Miller, 2017), and people observe others to learn the
content of these normative standards (Bandura & Walters, 1977; Boyd et al., 2011). Two,
people can readily infer from others’ emotional expressions the antecedent state that
produced the emotion (Hareli et al., 2013; Van Kleef, 2016). Three, violating norms is a
common antecedent state of shame (Fessler, 2007; Higgins, 1987), and people express
shame, in part, to affirm their awareness of their norm violation (Keltner, 1995; Keltner
& Harker, 1998; Martens et al., 2012).
Integrating the above observations suggests that upon learning that someone feels
or would feel ashamed about a behavior, people will deduce that this behavior is
normatively inappropriate in this person’s social context. People will then adjust their
behavior accordingly in this context to behave in more socially appropriate ways,
presumably to avoid feeling ashamed themselves (see Fessler, 2004). We find support for
these predictions across five studies and two supplemental studies in which we
manipulate a target’s emotional expression and assess the effect on observers’ inferences
about a group’s social norms and subsequent normative behavior.
The idea that shame facilitates social cohesion through social learning aligns with
theories of cultural evolution that emphasize the importance of social learning for the
transmission of normative behaviors (Boyd et al., 2011; Chudek & Henrich, 2011).
However, this prediction contrasts with conclusions from past empirical work on shame.
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Some prominent reviews of shame have questioned shame’s positive effect on social
cohesion (see Tangney et al., 2007a, 2007b), given shame’s relationship with problematic
social behaviors and hostility toward others (e.g., Tangney et al., 1996; Tangney et al.,
2014). Other scholars have been more circumspect, concluding that shame’s effects on
appropriate behavior depend on third variables, such as the perceived repairability of the
offense (Bagozzi et al., 2003; de Hooge et al., 2010; Harris & Darby, 2009; Leach &
Cidam, 2015; Sznycer, 2019).
However, this past work focuses on the intraindividual effects of feeling ashamed
(e.g., how my feelings of shame affect me) and, thus, has overlooked critical ways that
shame can affect other relevant social actors. By examining the interindividual effects of
shame (e.g., how my feelings of shame affect you), the present work generates novel
predictions about how and why shame facilitates social cohesion.
Overall, the present findings show that shame transmits cultural information about
social norms and thus promotes norm acquisition and normative behavior. In doing so,
this work helps to reconcile competing views about shame and further challenges the idea
that shame undermines social cohesion (Tangney et al., 2007a, 2007b). This work
contributes to research on the social information people infer from others’ emotional
expressions (Hareli et al., 2013; Van Kleef, 2016). For instance, past work finds that
people infer norms from emotions in social situations (i.e., a group getting angry at
someone for a behavior) (Hareli et al., 2013, 2015). We expand on these findings by
identifying how a person’s emotional response to their behavior affects those who
witness it, opening new perspectives about the interindividual consequences of selfconscious emotions (Martens et al., 2012; Martens & Tracy, 2013).
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Overview of Studies
In each study, we varied whether a target expressed shame about a behavior. We
then assessed participants’ inferences about the injunctive and descriptive norms
regarding the behavior and their behavioral intentions (Studies 1, 2, 3, and S1) or their
incentivized behavior (Studies 4, 5, and S2). We made no a priori predictions about
whether shame would affect injunctive and descriptive norms differently. While past
work finds that shame arises from norm violations, (Fessler, 2007; Higgins, 1987) it does
not delineate between injunctive or descriptive norms in its theorizing about the
antecedents of shame (e.g., van Kleef et al., 2015). Thus, we measured both types of
norms to explore whether people infer the content of both types of norms, or one norm
more than the other from witnessing others’ shame expressions.
Given our focus on norm acquisition we avoided behaviors in which a universal
norm already exists. We operationalized shame differently across the studies for stimulus
sampling purposes, including having a target convey that they felt ashamed (Studies 1, 4,
5, S1, and S2) or would feel ashamed (Studies 2 and 3) through nonverbal expressions
(Study 1, 4, 5, and S2), responses to a workplace questionnaire (Studies 2 and 3), or text
conversations (S1).7 We posted the study materials and de-identified data here:
https://osf.io/ujhn9/?view_only=e39735fc213341b3aa176a04034ec4ea
Study 1
In Study 1, we manipulated whether an employee expressed shame, anger, or a
neutral reaction to a workplace behavior and assessed the effect on participants’

7

Studies 1-3 are presented in the chronological order they were conducted. Studies 4, S1, and S2 were
conducted after Study 5.
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inferences about the workplace’s norms and behavioral intentions. We compared shame
to anger because anger communicates a violation of expectation and disapproval (Hareli
et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2004). Thus, this comparison provides insight into the
relative magnitude of shame’s effect on norm acquisition.
Method
Participants. We administered Study 1 as part of an online mass testing session
in the university’s behavioral research lab. The size of the mass testing session
determined the sample size. We received completed responses from 190 participants (146
women, 44 men; Mage = 21.11, SDage = 2.39). We did not preregister this study, and we
included all participants in our analyses.
Procedure. Participants read about an employee (e.g., “James”) and three
different behaviors this employee engaged in at their company (e.g., “Baxter Financial”).
Participants saw the employee’s emotional response to each of these behaviors and
answered questions about each behavior. Figure 5 shows an example of the stimuli. In
Studies 1-3, the names of the employee and the company varied for stimulus sampling
purposes (see SOM-R for details).
We randomly sampled three workplace behaviors (without replacement) from a
larger bank of behaviors, which the SOM-R, Table S1 shows. Example workplace
behaviors include, “Shared a wild, very out-of-the-box idea during a meeting,” and
“Challenged their supervisor's judgment in a meeting.”
We presented behaviors one at a time and randomly determined, with
replacement, whether the employee conveyed shame, anger, or a neutral expression about

78

their behavior. This approach means that participants could see the target express shame
in response to zero, one, two, or three workplace behaviors.
For each behavior, we measured three dependent variables. We measured
perceptions of the company's injunctive norms about the behavior (i.e., the extent to
which employees at the company should not engage in this behavior) and perceptions of
the company’s descriptive norms about the behavior (i.e., the extent to which it is
uncommon for employees at the company to engage in this behavior). We also measured
participants’ behavioral intentions (i.e., the likelihood of engaging in this behavior if they
worked at the company). Table 1 shows the exact items we used to measure these
variables and the internal consistency of these measures. For each dependent variable, we
averaged the items to create a composite measure.
Table 1
Full List of Scale Items Used to Measure Injunctive Norms, Descriptive norms, and
Behavioral Intentions (Studies 1-3)
Alpha
Item
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
behavior] discouraged? (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely)
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
behavior] the wrong way to behave? (1 = not at all; 5 =
extremely)
.93
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
behavior] an inappropriate way to act? (1 = not at all; 5
= extremely)
To what extent does [workplace behavior] violate the
norms of behavior at [company name]? (1 = not at all; 5
= extremely)
Descriptive norms To what extent is [workplace behavior] an atypical way
(Uncommon to do) to act at [company name]? (1 = not at all; 5 = extremely)
.96
To what extent is [workplace behavior] an abnormal
way to act at [company name]? (1 = not at all; 5 =
extremely)

Study Measure
Study 1 Injunctive norms
(Should not do)
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To what extent is [workplace behavior] an uncommon
way to act at [company name]? (1 = not at all; 5 =
extremely)
Imagine that you are a new employee at [company
Behavioral intentions name]. You want to succeed at [company name]. How
(Likely to do)
unlikely or likely are you to [workplace behavior]? (1 =
very unlikely; 5 = very likely)
Study 2
At [company name], how acceptable or unacceptable is
Injunctive norms
it for employees to [workplace behavior]? (1 = very
(Should not do)
unacceptable; 5 = very acceptable) ®
At [company name], are employees encouraged or
discouraged from [workplace behavior]? (1 = very
discouraged; 5 = very encouraged) ®
Do you think employees at [company name] would be
punished or praised for [workplace behavior]? (1 =
strongly punished; 5 = strongly praised) ®
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
Descriptive norms
behavior] an uncommon or common thing to do? (1 =
(Uncommon to do)
very uncommon; 5 = very common) ®
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
behavior] an uncustomary or customary thing to do? (1
= very uncustomary; 5 = very customary) ®
Imagine that you are a new employee at [company
Behavioral intentions name]. You want to succeed at [company name]. How
(Likely to do)
unlikely or likely are you to [workplace behavior]? (1 =
very unlikely; 5 = very likely)
Study 3
At [company name], how acceptable or unacceptable is
Injunctive norms
it for employees to [workplace behavior]? (1 = very
(Should not do)
unacceptable; 5 = very acceptable) ®
At [company name], are employees encouraged or
discouraged from [workplace behavior]? (1 = very
discouraged; 5 = very encouraged) ®
Do you think employees at [company name] would be
punished or praised for [workplace behavior]? (1 =
strongly punished; 5 = strongly praised) ®
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
Descriptive norms
behavior] an uncommon or common thing to do? (1 =
(Uncommon to do)
very uncommon; 5 = very common) ®
To what extent at [company name] is [workplace
behavior] an uncustomary or customary thing to do? (1
= very uncustomary; 5 = very customary) ®
Imagine that you are a new employee at [company
Behavioral intentions name]. You want to succeed at [company name]. How
(Likely to do)
unlikely or likely are you to [workplace behavior]? (1 =
very unlikely; 5 = very likely)

80

.91

.91

.91

.91

Notes: ® indicates reverse-scoring of item. Injunctive norms are scored such that higher
values equate to stronger proscriptions against a behavior (should not do); descriptive
norms are scored such that higher values equate to the behavior being uncommon
(uncommon to do); behavioral intentions are scored such that higher values equate to
being more likely to engage in the behavior (likely to do). Alpha levels are calculated at
the observation level. Content in brackets was dynamically populated based on which
company name and which workplace behaviors were pulled randomly from the larger
bank of company names and behaviors.
Figure 5
An Example of the Stimuli Used to Manipulate the Emotion an Employee Expressed
about a Workplace Behavior (Study 1)
Figure 5

Note. Stimuli were developed using the UC Davis Set of Emotion Expressions
(UCDSEE) (Tracy et al., 2009). The emotion expressions are from left to right: anger,
neutral, shame. We varied the target’s name and the company’s name (see SOM-R for
details).

Manipulation check. At the end of the study, participants saw four pictures of the
employee showing shame, anger, happiness, or a neutral expression. We did not
manipulate happiness. We included a picture of the employee expressing happiness in the
manipulation check to limit participants’ suspicion that the purpose of the study was
focused on negative emotions. Participants selected which emotion the employee
expressed from five emotions (happy, angry, ashamed, neutral, surprised).
Results
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Manipulation check. Nearly all participants (96%, N = 180) accurately identified
all four emotions.
Analysis. Our analyses are at the level of an individual workplace behavior. Each
participant answered questions about three behaviors, so the total number of observations
for the analyses is 570. Our predictor variable is the target's emotion in response to the
behavior: a neutral expression, anger, or shame. We created three dummy variables
corresponding to each of the three emotions. There are three dependent variables:
injunctive norms (i.e., should not do), descriptive norms (i.e., uncommon to do), and
behavioral intentions (i.e., likely to do). In each regression model, we regressed one
dependent variable on two of the three dummy variables. We clustered standard errors by
participant.
We calculated Cohen’s f2 as a measure of effect size given that we have multiple
observations within participant, following the guidelines of Selya and colleagues (2012).
According to Cohen’s (1988) guidelines, f 2 ≥ 0.02, f 2 ≥ 0.15, and f 2 ≥ 0.35 represent
small, medium, and large effect sizes, respectively.
We made no primary predictions about the effect of any specific workplace
behavior, employee name, or company name, so we collapsed across these attributes in
the primary analyses.
Results. As shown in Figure 6, participants perceived stronger injunctive norms
at a company when an employee expressed shame than when the employee had a neutral
reaction or expressed anger (Table 2, Models 1-2). Participants judged a behavior as less
common when the employee expressed shame than when the employee had a neutral
reaction or anger, although the latter difference was marginally significant (Table 2,
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Models 3-4). Participants were less likely to engage in a workplace behavior when the
employee expressed shame than a neutral reaction or anger (Table 2, Models 5-6).
Exploratory analyses showed that these effects were consistent across individual
workplace behaviors (SOM-U, Figure S1), the names assigned to the company (SOM-U,
Figure S2), and the names assigned to the employee (SOM-U, Figure S3). We simulated
a between-subjects design by restricting the analysis to the first behavior participants
evaluated. The effects were consistent under this separate evaluation (SOM-U, Figure
S4). Overall, Study 1 provides initial evidence that people learn the content of social
norms from others’ expressions of shame.
Figure 6
Effect of Emotion Condition on Injunctive Norms, Descriptive Norms, and Behavioral
Intentions (Study 1)

Note. The y axis represents scores on the dependent variables. Error bars represent ± 1
95% confidence interval.
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Table 2
Results of Regression Models Predicting the Three Dependent Variables (Study 1)
Injunctive Norms
(should not do)
Model 1

Variable
Shame
Anger

Coef.
(SE)
1.56
(0.10)
1.29
(0.10)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)
< .0001
(0.66)
< .0001
(0.48)

1.84
(0.07)

< .0001

Neutral
Constant

Descriptive Norms
(uncommon to do)
Model 2

Coef.
(SE)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)

-0.27
(0.10)
-1.56
(0.10)
3.40
(0.07)

.007
(0.01)
< .0001
(0.66)
< .0001

Model 3
Coef.
(SE)
1.44
(0.10)
1.25
(0.10)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)
< .0001
(0.51)
< .0001
(0.40)

1.87
(0.07)

< .0001

Behavioral Intentions
(likely to do)

Model 4
Coef.
(SE)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)

-0.19
(0.11)
-1.44
(0.10)
3.31
(0.08)

.075
(0.00)
< .0001
(0.51)
< .0001

Model 5
Coef.
(SE)
-1.16
(0.13)
-0.85
(0.14)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)
< .0001
(0.21)
< .0001
(0.13)

2.95
(0.10)

< .0001

Model 6
Coef.
(SE)

p value
(Cohen’s f2)

0.31
(0.11)
1.16
(0.13)
1.79
(0.08)

.004
(0.01)
< .0001
(0.21)
< .0001
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Note. N = 570, Std. Err. adjusted for 190 clusters. Higher values equate to stronger proscriptions against the behavior
(injunctive norms), less common behaviors (descriptive norms), and stronger intentions to engage in the behavior (behavioral
intentions). Anger, Shame, and Neutral are all dummy variables. Models 1, 3, and 5 compare shame and anger to a neutral
expression. Models 2, 4, and 6 compare shame to a neutral expression and anger. Table S1 in the SOM-U presents the raw
mean and standard deviation of each measure for each emotion.

Study 2
In Study 2, participants evaluated an employee’s supposed responses to a
workplace questionnaire regarding how they would feel about engaging in various
workplace behaviors: ashamed, anxious, sad, neutral, happy, or proud. Comparing shame
to sadness and anxiety provides another test of the relative magnitude of shame's effect
on norm acquisition. We included happiness and pride for exploratory purposes.
Method
Participants. We posted a study to Prolific Academic for 500 U.S.-based
participants, intending to retain 75 participants (150 observations) per condition. After
following our preregistered data exclusion plan (SOM-R, Table S2), the final sample
consisted of 490 people (239 women, 237 men, 10 indicated a different gender identity,
four prefer not state; Mage = 32.41, SDage = 12.37). We preregistered the study here:
https://aspredicted.org/KXE_VWS
Procedure. We manipulated how an employee reported they would feel for
engaging in various workplace behaviors. We did this under the guise of having
participants review someone’s responses to a confidential, online workplace survey (see
Levine & Wald, 2020; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2012 for similar paradigms). We told
participants:
A confidential survey was done to assess employees' reactions to various
things someone could do at their company (e.g., showing up five minutes
late to a meeting; attending virtual conferences during the workday). We
asked 152 employees at Baxter Financial to imagine that they engaged in
various behaviors at Baxter Financial (e.g., attended a virtual conference
during the workday) and how they would feel about engaging in this
behavior. Employees selected the expression that captured the emotion
they would feel in response to the behavior.
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We gave participants a screenshot of this supposed questionnaire as an example
(see Figure 7). We explained that employees had the option of selecting ashamed,
anxious, sad, neutral, happy, or proud. The emotion the employee selected indicated how
the employee said they would feel about engaging in the behavior.
Figure 7
Stimuli Used to Manipulate How an Employee Would Feel Engaging in Different
Workplace Behaviors (Studies 2-3)
Panel A

Panel B

Page Break
Page Break

Note. Panel A shows the materials from Study 2. Panel B shows the materials from Study
3. The name of the company, the workplace behavior, and the employee's answer
changed dynamically. In Panel B, the images were taken from the UCDSEE database
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(Tracy et al., 2009). The emotion expressions are from left to right: neutral, pride,
embarrassment, and shame. In Study 3, we had a scale of female faces (as shown here)
and one with male faces. See SOM-U (Figure S8) for the male faces scale.
Participants saw the employees’ supposed responses to two workplace behaviors,
which we randomly assigned without replacement. We manipulated how the employee
would feel about engaging in the behavior by varying which emotion the employee
selected.
We randomly paired one of the six emotional expressions with each workplace
behavior, without replacement. Participants then answered questions about the
company’s injunctive norms and descriptive norms about the behavior. They also
indicated their likelihood of engaging in the behavior if they worked at the company. The
full list of questions is in Table 1.
Results
Analysis. We followed the same analysis plan as described in Study 1. Each
participant answered questions about two behaviors, so the total number of observations
for the analyses is 980. We created six dummy variables corresponding to each of the six
emotions. In each regression model, we regressed one of the three dependent variables on
five of the six dummy variables: injunctive norms (i.e., should not do), descriptive norms
(i.e., uncommon to do), and behavioral intentions (i.e., likely to do). We clustered
standard errors by participant.
Results. Figure 8 shows mean differences in the dependent variables across the
six emotion conditions. Table 3 shows the regression results.
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Participants inferred stronger injunctive norms against a behavior when the
employee expressed shame than each of the other discrete emotional expressions (Table
3, Model 2). Participants also inferred that a behavior was less common when an
employee expressed shame than when they expressed the other discrete emotions (Table
3, Model 4). Participants were also the least likely to engage in the behavior when the
employee expressed shame, except compared to sadness (Table 3, Model 6). The results
were consistent across the sampled features of the stimuli (SOM-U, Figures S5-S6) and
under separate evaluation (SOM-U, Figure S7).
Figure 8
Effect of Emotion Condition on Injunctive Norms, Descriptive Norms, and Behavioral
Intentions (Study 2)

Note. The y axis represents scores on the dependent variables. Error bars represent ± 1
95% confidence interval.
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Table 3
Results of Regression Models Predicting the Three Dependent Variables (Study 2)
Injunctive Norms
(should not do)
Model 1
p value
(Cohen’s f2)
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Variable

Coef.
(SE)

Shame

1.10
(0.09)

<.0001
(0.16)

Sadness

0.75
(0.09)

<.0001
(0.07)

Anxiety

0.49
(0.10)

<.0001
(0.03)

-0.54
(0.10)
-0.74
(0.10)
2.84
(0.06)

<.0001
(0.04)
<.0001
(0.07)
<.0001

Neutral
Happiness
Pride
Constant

Descriptive Norms
(uncommon to do)
Model 3
Model 4
Coef.
p value
Coef.
p value
(SE)
(Cohen’s f2)
(SE)
(Cohen’s f2)

Behavioral Intentions
(likely to do)
Model 5
Model 6
Coef.
p value
Coef.
p value
(SE)
(Cohen’s f2)
(SE)
(Cohen’s f2)

<.0001

1.31
(0.10)
1.00

.001

-1.05
(0.13)
-1.00

(0.08)

(0.02)

-0.61
(0.10)
-1.10
(0.09)
-1.64
(0.10)
-1.84
(0.10)
3.94
(0.06)

<.0001
(0.05)
<.0001
(0.16)
<.0001
(0.34)
<.0001
(0.43)
<.0001

Coef.
(SE)

-0.35

Model 2
p value
(Cohen’s f2)

<.0001
(0.19)
<.0001

-0.31

(0.10)

(0.11)

(0.09)

(0.01)

0.77
(0.11)

<.0001
(0.06)

-0.01
(0.11)
-0.07
(0.11)
2.76
(0.07)

.935
(0.00)
.534
(0.00)
<.0001

-0.54
(0.10)
-1.31
(0.10)
-1.32
(0.10)
-1.38
(0.11)
4.07
(0.07)

<.0001
(0.03)
<.0001
(0.19)
<.0001
(0.19)
<.0001
(0.22)
<.0001

<.0001
(0.08)
<.0001

0.05

.687

(0.13)

(0.07)

(0.12)

(0.00)

-0.77
(0.14)

<.0001
(0.04)

0.22
(0.14)
0.53
(0.13)
2.99
(0.10)

.120
(0.00)
<.0001
(0.02)
<.0001

0.28
(0.13)
1.05
(0.13)
1.26
(0.14)
1.58
(0.13)
1.95
(0.09)

.025
(0.00)
<.0001
(0.08)
<.0001
(0.11)
<.0001
(0.17)
<.0001

Note. N = 980, Std. Err. adjusted for 490 clusters. Higher values equate to stronger proscriptions against the behavior
(injunctive norms), less common behaviors (descriptive norms), and stronger intentions to engage in the behavior (behavioral
intentions). Each emotion is a dummy variable. Models 1, 3, and 5 compare the discrete emotions to a neutral expression.
Models 2, 4, and 6 compare shame to the other discrete emotions and a neutral expression. Table S2 in the SOM-U presents
the raw mean and standard deviation of each measure for each emotion.

Follow-up supplementary study. Comparing shame to sadness, we found a
significant effect on norm acquisition but not on behavioral intentions. We conducted a
preregistered follow-up study that focused only on this comparison. We manipulated
whether an employee expressed shame or sadness about a workplace behavior, using
different stimuli (e.g., text conversations between friends). We report this study in the
SOM-R (Study S1). Shame sent stronger information about social norms and led to lower
behavioral intentions than sadness (SOM-R, Table A1). Additional analyses showed that
participants saw violating a norm as a stronger cause of shame than sadness, but
experiencing disappointment as a stronger cause of sadness than shame (SOM-R, Table
A2). This finding suggests that shame and sadness may affect observers’ behaviors, but
for different reasons—an idea we return to in the General Discussion.
Study 3
Study 3 had the same design as Study 2. However, we changed the response scale
from emotion words to non-verbal expressions and scale options to shame,
embarrassment, neutral, and pride. We compared shame to embarrassment to further
assess the magnitude of shame’s effects relative to other discrete negative emotions.
Some scholars regard embarrassment as a less intense version of shame (e.g., Scheff,
2006). Other scholars see shame and embarrassment as arising from different sources.
Shame arises from moral failings and evokes disgust in others, and embarrassment arises
more from failings of social conventions (e.g., tripping) and arouses amusement in others
(e.g., Keltner, 1995, 1996). Both these views suggest that shame would convey stronger
signals of normative proscriptions than embarrassment.
Method
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Participants. We posted a study to Prolific Academic for 500 U.S.-based
participants to have approximately 125 participants (250 observations) per emotion. We
anticipated smaller effects than what we observed in Study 2, given the changes we made
to the study. After following our preregistered data exclusion plan (SOM-R, Table S1),
the final sample consisted of 463 people (205 women, 255 men, two indicated a different
gender identity, one preferred not state; Mage = 34.90, SDage = 11.52). We preregistered
the study here: https://aspredicted.org/ZZD_QDM
Procedure. The study was identical to Study 2, except that we changed the
emotion response scale that the employees supposedly used to indicate how they would
feel if they engaged in various workplace behaviors. We used images rather than emotion
words on the scale (Figure 7, Panel B). Each image showed a person expressing an
emotion (shame, embarrassment, or pride) or a neutral reaction. In this way, the response
scale was akin to Kunin’s Faces Scale, a widely used measure to assess job satisfaction
(Kunin, 1955). We used validated images from the UCDSEE database to construct the
emotions response scale (Tracy et al., 2009).
Participants saw the responses from a single employee who reported how they
would feel if they engaged in two different workplace behaviors. Participants saw which
emotion, out of a set of four emotions, the employee selected in response to the behavior
for each workplace behavior. See Figure 7 for an example of the manipulation.
Participants answered the same dependent measures as Study 2.
Results
Manipulation Check. Before analyses, we excluded participants (N = 34) who
incorrectly identified more than two emotional expressions from the response scale per
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our preregistration. Most participants (N = 277, 60%) correctly identified all four
emotional expressions. The other participants correctly identified three (N =113, 24%)
and two (N = 73, 16%) emotional expressions.
Analysis. We followed the same analysis plan as the previous studies. Each
participant answered questions about two behaviors, so the total number of observations
for analyses is 926. In each regression model, we regressed one of the dependent
variables on three of the four emotions. We clustered standard errors by participant.
Results. Figure 9 shows mean differences in the dependent variables across
conditions (shame, embarrassment, neutral, pride). Table 4 shows the regression results.
Participants inferred that a workplace behavior was less normative when an
employee conveyed shame than embarrassment, a neutral expression, or pride (see Table
4, Model 2 for injunctive norms, and Model 4 for descriptive norms). Participants also
had lower behavioral intentions when the target expressed shame than embarrassment, a
neutral expression, or pride (see Table 4, Model 6).
These results were consistent across the sampled stimuli (SOM-U, Figures S9S11) and under separate evaluation (SOM-U, Figure S12). Thus, Study 3 conceptually
replicated the previous results.
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Figure 9
Effect of Emotion Condition on Injunctive Norms, Descriptive Norms, and Behavioral
Intentions (Study 3)

Note. The y axis represents scores on the dependent variables. Error bars represent ± 1
95% confidence interval.
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Table 4
Results of Regression Models Predicting the Three Dependent Variables (Study 3)

Variable

Shame
Embarrassment
Neutral
Pride
Constant

Injunctive Norms
(should not do)
Model 1
Model 2
Coef.
p value
Coef.
p value
(SE)
(Cohen’s
(SE)
(Cohen’s
f2)
f2)
0.97
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.16)
0.38
<.0001
-0.59
<.0001
(0.08)
(0.03)
(0.08)
(0.06)
-0.97
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.16)
-0.76
<.0001
-1.73
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.48)
2.89
<.0001
3.86
<.0001
(0.06)
(0.07)

Descriptive Norms
(uncommon to do)
Model 3
Model 4
Coef.
p value
Coef.
p value
(SE)
(Cohen’s
(SE)
(Cohen’s
f2)
f2)
0.81
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.10)
0.36
<.0001
-0.45
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.02)
(0.09)
(0.03)
-0.81
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.10)
-0.59
<.0001
-1.40
<.0001
(0.09)
(0.05)
(0.09)
(0.28)
3.05
<.0001
3.86
<.0001
(0.07)
(0.07)

Behavioral Intentions
(likely to do)
Model 5
Model 6
Coef.
p value
Coef.
p value
(SE)
(Cohen’s
(SE)
(Cohen’s
f2)
f2)
-0.68
<.0001
(0.11)
(0.05)
-0.22
0.056
0.46
<.0001
(0.11)
(0.01)
(0.11)
(0.02)
0.68
<.0001
(0.11)
(0.05)
0.86
<.0001
1.54
<.0001
(0.12)
(0.07)
(0.12)
(0.22)
2.68
<.0001
2.00
<.0001
(0.08)
(0.08)
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Note. N = 926, Std. Err. adjusted for 463 clusters. Higher values equate to stronger proscriptions against the behavior
(injunctive norms), less common behaviors (descriptive norms), and stronger intentions to engage in the behavior
(behavioral intentions). Each emotion is a dummy variable. Models 1, 3, and 5 compare a neutral expression to all
discrete emotions. Models 2, 4, and 6 compare shame to the other emotions and a neutral expression. Table S3 in the
SOM-U presents the raw mean and standard deviation of each measure for each emotion.

Study 4
Study 4 assessed how seeing someone else feel ashamed affects incentivized
behavior. Participants completed an asynchronous competitive group task that involved
generating rhymes. Participants saw a previous participant select a Rhyme Booster,
which provided a personal advantage in the rhyming task. We varied whether this
previous participant expressed shame (or reacted neutrally) to selecting a Rhyme Booster.
We predicted that participants would be less likely to use a Rhyme Booster when they
saw the previous participant express shame about using it because participants would
infer that using a Rhyme Booster is normatively inappropriate.
Method
Participants. A power analysis showed that we would need 519 participants per
condition for 90% power (assuming a base rate of 50%). We posted a study to Amazon
Mechanical Turk for 1,050 U.S.-based participants. The final sample consisted of 953
people (533 women, 408 men, 7 indicated a different gender identity, and five did not
indicate their gender; Mage = 41.42, SDage = 12.56, see SOM-R, Table S2 for exclusion
criteria). We preregistered the study here: https://aspredicted.org/MVT_79D
Procedure. The goal of Study 4 was to assess how participants would behave
upon seeing someone’s emotional reaction to their behavior. All participants were
provided the same information and witnessed the target make the same decision. The
only difference across conditions was whether the target expressed shame or had a
neutral expression to their decision.
Participants learned that they would complete an asynchronous group decisionmaking task. In the task, participants would receive a Focal Word (e.g., chin) and have a
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specified time to generate English words that rhymed with the Focal Word (e.g., grin, fin,
sin). We told participants that they were joining a group of university students. We
further explained that the other group members recently completed a round of the task
synchronously as part of a virtual study in our university’s research lab. As part of this
previous round, the group members agreed to be recorded (we assured participants that
they would not be recorded in the asynchronous round).
Participants learned that the group has four members. They would join the group
as the new Group Member 4. As a new group member, participants learned that part of
their job was to make sense of the decisions and experiences of their group. To help them
do this, participants would watch a video of the former Group Member 4 and see their
decisions in the previous synchronous round of this task.
Participants then received information about their bonus payment and the option
to use a Rhyme Booster. We told participants that if they submitted the most rhymes in
the group, they would earn a bonus of $0.25. If they did not submit the most rhymes in
the group, they would earn a bonus of $0.15.
We then explained that they would have the opportunity to use a Rhyme Booster.
Participants’ choice to use a Rhyme Booster was the focal behavioral outcome in the
study. We explicitly stated that “using a Rhyme Booster can give you an advantage. It
can help you to generate the most rhymes.” We assured participants that the group would
not know them, but that the group would learn whether the participant used a Rhyme
Booster.
Manipulation. After answering six multiple-choice comprehension check
questions, participants watched a video of the previous synchronous round of the task. In
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the video, participants shadowed Group Member 4. They saw Group Member 4 decide to
use a Rhyme Booster. They received no information about the other group members’
decisions to use a Rhyme Booster. We did not show Group Member 4 generating the
rhymes, but we told participants that Group Member 4 generated eight rhymes and that
the other group members generated fewer than five rhymes. Thus, Group Member 4
generated the most rhymes in the group.
Participants then learned that the other group members’ decisions to use a Rhyme
Booster were revealed to Group Member 4 at the end of the round. Participants then saw
how Group Member 4 reacted after they learned this information. Participants in the
Shame Expression Condition (N = 479) saw Group Member 4 nonverbally express
shame. Participants in the Neutral Expression Condition (N = 474) saw Group Member 4
have a neutral expression. Figure 10 provides screenshots of these two reactions. A
complete storyboard of the video that participants watched is in the SOM-U, Figure S13.
(See the OSF page for the videos.)
After watching the video, participants answered questions about the norms in the
group. They then indicated whether they would like to use a Rhyme Booster (our focal
behavioral outcome variable). After making this decision, participants proceeded to the
rhyme generation page. They had 30 seconds to generate as many rhymes as possible
with a Focal Word.
After submitting their rhymes, participants concluded the study by answering a
manipulation check about Group Member 4’s emotional reaction and an open-ended
question regarding any comments or concerns.
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Stimuli. We had three actors (two female and one male) record themselves
expressing both shame and a neutral expression (see Figure 10 for an example). We
randomly assigned participants to watch one of these three actors play Group Member 4.
A separate group of actors played Group Members 1, 2, and 3 and were held constant
across conditions. We conducted two pilot tests to validate the actors’ emotional
expressions. These pilot tests showed that participants most commonly saw the actor’s
expression as shame. We report the results of these validation tests in the SOM-U (Tables
S4-S6). The validity of our stimuli is further supported by the manipulation checks
conducted at the end of each study.
Behavior (using a Rhyme Booster). We aligned the financial incentive with the
behavior of the target (i.e., using a Rhyme Booster). Participants earned a $0.25 bonus for
generating the most rhymes in the group (and $0.15 if they did not). A Rhyme Booster
provided an advantage for generating rhymes.
Figure 10
Screenshots from the Video Recording Used to Manipulate a Target’s Reaction to Using
a Rhyme Booster (Study 4)
Panel A

Panel B

Note. Shown are screenshots of the video that manipulated the actor’s emotional
expression. Participants in the Neutral Expression Condition saw the actor have a neutral
expression to their choice to use a Rhyme Booster (Panel A). Participants in the Shame
Expression Condition saw the actor express shame to their choice to use a Rhyme
Booster (Panel B).
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Injunctive Norms. Participants answered two questions about the group’s
injunctive norms regarding Rhyme Boosters: 1) “In this group, is it more acceptable to
use a Rhyme Booster or not to use a Rhyme Booster?” and 2) “In this group, is it more
wrong/inappropriate to use a Rhyme Booster or not to use a Rhyme Booster?”
Participants answered the questions on 3-point scales. We combined these two measures
to create a composite measure. Participants received a score of one if they indicated that
using a Rhyme Booster was more wrong/inappropriate and that not using a Rhyme
Booster was more acceptable. We assigned the value of zero to all other participants. We
treat participants with a score of one as seeing stronger injunctive norms against using a
Rhyme Booster.
Descriptive norms. Participants indicated whether they thought each group
member did or did not use a Rhyme Booster. We totaled the number of group members
that participants believed did not use a Rhyme Booster. The range of this measure is 0 to
3, with higher values indicating that using a Rhyme Booster is less common.
Rhyming performance. Participants had 30 seconds to generate English words
that rhymed with a Focal Word (e.g., Lamp). We gave participants 13 textboxes to type
their rhymes. For participants who chose to forgo a Rhyme Booster, all thirteen textboxes
were blank at the start of the task. The first four boxes were populated with four free
rhymes for participants who chose a Rhyme Booster. While participants knew that using
a Rhyme Booster would give them an advantage, this specific benefit of receiving four
free rhymes was unknown to participants when they chose to use a Rhyme Booster.
Manipulation check. Participants saw a screenshot of Group Member 4’s
emotional reaction from the video manipulation. We asked participants: “Would you say
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Group Member 4 is experiencing an emotion or is in more of a neutral state?”
(Experiencing an emotion; More in a neutral state). Participants who indicated that
Group Member 4 is experiencing an emotion selected the emotion that Group Member 4
is experiencing (Happiness, Anger, Shame, Sadness).
Results
Suspicion. At the end of the study, we asked participants to state any comments
or concerns they had about the study. About one-third of participants (N = 349)
commented on the study, but only five reported suspicion about the authenticity of the
situation.
Manipulation Check. Nearly all participants correctly identified the target’s
emotional expression; 91% of participants assigned to the Neutral Expression Condition
indicated that the target was in a neutral state, and 89% of participants assigned the
Shame Expression Condition indicated that the target was experiencing shame. The
results of the primary analyses remain the same if we include only the participants who
accurately identified the actor’s expression as shame (Table S3 in the SOM-R).
Behavior (using a Rhyme Booster). As shown in Figure 11, when participants
saw someone react neutrally to using a Rhyme Booster (Neutral Expression Condition),
48% of participants chose to use a Rhyme Booster. However, when participants saw
someone express shame about using a Rhyme Booster (Shame Expression Condition),
37% of participants chose to use a Rhyme Booster, χ2(N = 953, 1) = 12.12, p <.0001, d =
0.23, 95% CI [0.10, 0.35]. In exploratory analyses, we find a similar pattern of results for
each actor (SOM-U, Figure S14).
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Figure 11
Effect of Shame Expression on Incentivized Behavior (Study 4)

Note. Error bars represent ± 1 95% confidence interval.
Injunctive norms. More participants in the Shame Expression Condition (67%)
perceived an injunctive norm against using a Rhyme Booster relative to those in the
Neutral Expression Condition (34%, χ2(N = 953, 1) = 108.10, p <.0001, d = 0.71, 95% CI
[0.58, 0.85], see SOM-U, Figure S15).
Descriptive norms. On average, participants in the Shame Expression Condition
believed that more non-target group members chose not to use a Rhyme Booster (M =
2.72, SE = 0.04) relative to participants in the Neutral Expression Condition (M = 2.29,
SE = 0.05, t(951) = 6.75, p <.0001, d = 0.44, 95% CI [0.31, 0.57], see SOM-U, Figure
S16). Thus, participants saw the target’s behavior as less common when the target
expressed shame.
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Mediation. We tested whether participants' perceptions of the injunctive and
descriptive norms in the group mediated the effect of emotion expression on participants'
incentivized choice. We used 5,000 bootstrapped resamplings of the data to estimate the
indirect effects of the mediators simultaneously (Preacher & Hayes, 2008; UCLA:
Statistical Consulting Group, 2021). As shown in Figure 12, we found that both the
indirect effect of injunctive norms (b = -0.05, SE = 0.01, p <.0001, 95% CI [-0.07, -0.02]
and the indirect effect of descriptive norms (b = -0.04, SE = 0.01, p <.0001, 95% CI [0.06, -0.02] mediated the effect of emotion expression on participants’ choice. Together,
the total indirect effects mediated 72% of the total effect.
Advantage of Using a Rhyme Booster. We told participants that a Rhyme
Booster would give them an advantage in the task. The Rhyme Booster worked as
intended. We had three undergraduate students complete the study to represent the
performances of Group Members 1, 2, and 3. These students did not use a Rhyme
Booster. The top-performing student submitted six rhymes. Participants who submitted
more than six rhymes received a $0.25 bonus. All other participants got a $0.15 bonus.
Sixty-five percent of participants who used a Rhyme Booster and 32% of participants
who did not use a Rhyme Booster earned a $0.25 bonus, χ2(N = 953, 1) = 104.48, p
<.0001, d = 0.71, 95% CI [0.58, 0.84] (see SOM-U, Figure S17 for details).
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Figure 12
Mediation Analysis of the Effect of Emotion Expression on Participants’ Behavior Via
Inferred Social Norms (Study 4)

Note. Shown are the results of the mediation model simultaneously testing the indirect
effects of perceived injunctive and descriptive norms on the relationship between the
target's emotional expression and participants' incentivized choice (using a Rhyme
Booster).
ns
p > .10, *** p < .001.

Discussion
Study 4 provides evidence that people adjust their behavior upon witnessing
someone express shame, even if this adjustment is financially disadvantageous.
Participants were less likely to use a Rhyme Booster in a competitive rhyming task when
they observed someone express shame for using one because this person’s shame
signaled that using a Rhyme Booster was normatively inappropriate.
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Study 5
Study 5 was similar to Study 4. However, we told participants the precise
financial cost of avoiding the target’s choice and changed the focal behavior to ensure
that participants had no prior beliefs about the (in)appropriateness of the behavior.
Method
Participants. A power analysis suggested that we would have 90% power to
detect an estimated ten percentage-point effect with 260 participants per condition
(assuming a base rate of 10%). We posted a study to Prolific Academic for 650
participants because we expected some participants would be excluded (see SOM-R,
Table S2). We restricted participation to U.S. citizens who currently live in the U.S. The
final sample consisted of 527 people (240 women, 281 men, 5 indicated a different
gender identity, and one preferred not to indicate their gender, Mage = 33.55, SDage =
11.79). We preregistered the study here: https://aspredicted.org/JAB_EJX
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 4. Participants again learned that
they would complete an asynchronous group decision-making task. However, instead of
completing a rhyming task and choosing whether to use a Rhyme Booster, participants
saw two different ovals. The ovals had different monetary values associated with them.
The focal behavior was which oval participants chose (see Figure 13 for an example).
Similar to Study 4, participants watched a video recording supposedly of previous
rounds of the task. They again learned that they would participate asynchronously as
Group Member 4 and shadow Group Member 4 before each round.
Participants completed two rounds of the task. In both rounds, the task involved
choosing between ovals (see Figure 13). The ovals were the same color, but they
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appeared to be two different colors (i.e., a Munker Illusion, see Novick, 2021). In both
rounds, participants saw how Group Member 4 reacted when their decisions were
publicized to the group. After each round, participants logged their incentivized decision
for that round. A complete storyboard of the videos that participants watched is in the
SOM-U, Figure S18. See the OSF page for the videos.
The purpose of the first round was to familiarize participants with the task. In
Round 1, Group Member 4 always selected BLUE and had a neutral expression after
their selection. In Round 2, Group Member 4 also selected BLUE. However, in this
round, we manipulated Group Member 4’s emotional expression. Participants in the
Shame Expression Condition (N = 255) saw Group Member 4 express shame about their
choice. Participants in the Neutral Expression Condition (N = 272) saw Group Member 4
react neutrally to their choice. Participants’ choice of BLUE or RED in the second round
was our primary dependent variable.
Manipulation. We used the same videos from Study 4 to manipulate whether the
target expressed shame or reacted neutrally to choosing BLUE. However, we also
included a fourth video of a second male actor. We randomly assigned participants to
watch one of these four actors play Group Member 4.
Behavior (choosing BLUE). To assess how the emotional expression of the target
affected participants' behavior, we told participants they would earn $0.19 if they selected
BLUE and $0.15 if they selected RED. The incentives were stated directly below the
question so that participants knew the precise financial implications of their decision (see
Figure 13). Similar to Study 4, we incentivized participants to select the target's choice
(i.e., BLUE) so that the financial incentive aligned with the observed behavior. With
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these incentives, we would expect most participants to select BLUE, unless they infer
some other cost for selecting BLUE, and they want to avoid this cost.
Figure 13
Focal Behavior (Study 5)
Panel A

Panel B

Note. Panel A shows Group Member 4’s focal choice. Group Member 4 always selected
BLUE. Panel B shows the choice presented to participants.
Injunctive norms. We measured participants’ perceptions of the injunctive norms
in the group about choosing BLUE or RED. We asked participants the same two
questions used in Study 4, substituting choosing RED or BLUE for not using or using a
Rhyme Booster. We combined these two measures again to create a binary measure of
perceived injunctive norms against the target’s behavior (choosing BLUE).
Descriptive norms. As in Study 4, participants indicated whether they thought
each of the other three non-target group members selected BLUE or RED. We again
totaled the number of group members that participants believed selected RED (i.e., the
target's forgone choice), thus higher values indicate that participants see choosing BLUE
(the target’s choice) as more uncommon.
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Manipulation check. Participants answered the same manipulation check
question about the target’s emotional reaction from Study 4.
Results
Manipulation check. Participants accurately identified the emotions; 87% of
participants in the Neutral Expression Condition indicated that Group Member 4 was in a
neutral state. Similarly, 59% of participants in the Shame Expression Condition correctly
identified the actor's expression of shame. Of the participants in the Shame Expression
Condition who misidentified the actor's expression, most identified the actor's expression
as sadness (see SOM-U for details). We note that the results of the primary analyses
remain the same if we include only the participants who accurately identified the target’s
emotion as shame (SOM-R, Table S3).
Behavior (choosing BLUE). As shown in Figure 14, in line with the financial
incentive, 89% of participants in the Neutral Expression Condition selected BLUE, the
financially advantageous choice. However, 71% of participants selected BLUE in the
Shame Expression Condition, with 29% of participants opting for the target's forgone
choice of RED. Overall, participants in the Shame Expression Condition were about three
times more likely than those in the Neutral Expression Condition to select the financially
disadvantageous option of RED, the target's forgone choice, χ2(N = 527, 1) = 25.92, p
<.0001, d = 0.45, 95% CI [0.28, 0.63]. In an exploratory analysis, we found this pattern
of results to be consistent across individual actors (see SOM-U, Figure S19).
Injunctive norms. More participants in the Shame Expression Condition (45%)
perceived an injunctive norm against the target's choice, BLUE, relative to those assigned

107

to the Neutral Expression Condition (13%, χ2(N = 527, 1) = 70.35, p <.0001, d = 0.78,
95% CI [0.61, 0.96], see SOM-U, Figure S20).
Figure 14
Effect of Shame Expression on Incentivized Behavior (Study 5)

Note. Error bars represent ± 1 95% confidence interval.

Descriptive norms. On average, participants in the Shame Expression Condition
believed that most of the other three group members selected "RED," the target's forgone
choice (M = 2.07, SE = 0.07). Participants in the Neutral Expression Condition believed
that the minority of the other three group members did the same (M = 1.29, SE = 0.07,
t(525) = 7.80, p <.0001, d = 0.68, 95% CI [0.50, 0.86] see SOM-U Figure S21). Thus,
participants saw the target’s behavior as less common when the target expressed shame.
Mediation. We used the same multiple mediation model used in Study 4 to test
whether participants' perceptions of the injunctive and descriptive norms in the group
mediated the effect of emotion expression on participants' incentivized choice. As shown
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in Figure 15, we replicate the mediation effects identified in Study 4. Both the indirect
effect of injunctive norms (b = -0.05, SE = 0.02, p = .010, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.02] and the
indirect effect of descriptive norms (b =- 0.06, SE = 0.01, p <.0001, 95% CI [-0.09, -0.03]
mediated the effect of emotion expression on participants’ choice. Together, the total
indirect effects mediated 64% of the total effect.
Figure 15
Mediation Analysis of the Effect of Emotion Expression on Participants’ Behavior Via
Inferred Social Norms (Study 5)

Note. Shown are the results of the mediation model simultaneously testing the indirect
effects of perceived injunctive and descriptive norms on the relationship between the
target's emotional expression and participants' incentivized choice (i.e., selecting BLUE).
†
p < .10, *** p < .001.

Discussion
Study 5 replicates Study 4 using a different behavior with precise financial
incentives. While the financial incentives in this study were small, this is an anonymous
online setting in which financial compensation is the primary motivation for study
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participation. Yet, participants were less likely to choose a smaller bonus when they
observed another person express shame for making the more lucrative choice.
In Studies 4 and 5, participants answered questions about perceived injunctive and
descriptive norms before making their incentivized choice. To ensure the findings do not
depend on this design feature, we conducted a preregistered replication of Study 5,
omitting the injunctive and descriptive norms questions (see Study S2 in the SOM-R for
full details). We find that participants were significantly more likely avoid the target’s
behavior (choosing BLUE) when the target expressed shame. This suggests that the
results are not driven by assessing the mediators before the focal behavioral dependent
variable.
General Discussion
Across studies, participants inferred a group's norms—both what people in the
group should do and commonly do—from others' shame expressions. Moreover, upon
witnessing someone express shame in response to a behavior, participants were less
likely to engage in the behavior. These findings show that shame broadcasts strong
signals of normatively appropriate behavior, and they provide the first evidence of how
one person’s shame affects the normative behavior of others. In doing so, these findings
identify social learning as a key mechanism through which shame positively affects
social cohesion.
We speculate that past research on shame may have overlooked shame's role in
norm acquisition and interindividual behavior regulation for two reasons. First, people
are socialized not to show or discuss shame in modern, Western societies (Fessler, 2004;
Scheff, 1988; Tracy & Matsumoto, 2008). Second, the contemporary study of shame
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often treats shame as a feature of a person rather than a feature of a situation or
transgression (e.g., Tangney et al., 2007a). Thus, this view may assume that observers
could learn little about the social environment from a person's experience of shame.
The present findings suggest that the expression of shame facilitates norm
acquisition and normative behavior in others. From a genetic evolutionary perspective,
this is not the primary function for which the shame expression evolved (see Fessler,
2007; Keltner & Harker, 1998). However, it may be a secondary adaptive benefit of the
shame expression because it supports the transmission of critical cultural information
(Boyd et al., 2011; see also Tracy et al., 2020 for a similar discussion regarding pride)
Scholars theorize that the primary function of the shame expression is to appease
higher-status or more dominant others, thereby reducing punishment for one’s
transgressions (Fessler, 2007; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2008; Keltner, 1995; Martens et al.,
2012). While appeasement reduces threats against the self and resolves conflict, it also
lowers one’s social status. People are highly motivated to avoid actions that would cause
them to lose status (Pettit et al., 2010) because of the benefits of being conferred high
status (Anderson et al., 2015). Consequently, people would benefit from recognizing and
learning from others’ shame because this capability would allow people to avoid
engaging in shameful behaviors. Thus, over time, those who were more attuned to others’
shame expressions and the normative information the expression conveyed may have
fared better than those who were not.
Some past work suggest that another reason individuals may avoid ashamed
others’ behaviors because the shame expression signals that the person is less competent,
and thus, copying their behavior would undermine the observer’s performance (see
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Martens & Tracy, 2013). However, Study 4 does not support this view. The target in this
study performed the best in their group and earned the most money. If participants were
motivated to copy the behaviors that would afford them the most individual success, they
would have copied the target’s victorious behavior. Instead, participants were less likely
to copy the target’s behavior when the target expressed shame because participants
inferred that the target’s behavior was normatively inappropriate.
We relied on U.S.-based samples, which may limit the generalizability of the
findings. Given the relatively low elaboration of the shame concept in the U.S. (Scheff,
2014), it is unclear whether the findings would extend beyond this cultural context. The
effects could be stronger in a cultural context with a more elaborated view of shame
because there is higher cultural awareness about the meaning of shame (e.g., Fessler,
2004). In contrast, shame may send particularly strong signals of social norm violations
in the U.S. because people rarely express shame. Identifying whether a more elaborated
cultural understanding of shame would moderate the present findings is an important
question for future research.
Our results show that shame reliably sent stronger signals of social norms
compared to anger, anxiety, sadness, and embarrassment, suggesting that shame is at least
quantitatively different from many other negative emotions. However, whether the
normative information that shame signals is qualitatively different from these other
negative emotions remains an open question. On the one hand, in Studies 1-3,
embarrassment, anxiety, anger, and sadness conveyed normative information about a
behavior relative to a neutral expression, suggesting a difference in magnitude. On the
other hand, in Study S1, participants saw shame and sadness as having different
112

antecedent causes, suggesting a difference in kind. We suggest that future work would
benefit from further comparing shame to other discrete emotions to flesh out the
functions of shame that are unique or shared with similar emotions.
An interesting direction for future work is to assess how shame influences social
norms and whether people’s conveyance of shame is a tool for changing social norms.
For instance, if people stop conveying shame in response to violating a social norm, does
this diminish the strength of the social norm? Conversely, if people start expressing
shame in response to what was previously considered an innocuous behavior, does this
create a new norm? The present findings provide foundational evidence about shame that
allows future research to address these types of questions. Understanding these questions
is critical because, as Scheff (2014) argues, “Shame may be one of the keys to
understanding our civilization” (p. 129).
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CHAPTER 3
DISENTANGLING DECEPTION:
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURE OF LYING AND CHEATING

Samuel E. Skowronek

An individual lies if they misreport honestly generated information. They cheat if they create
fraudulent information. Behavioral ethics scholars seek to investigate both types of unethical
behavior using experiments that rely on incentivized self-report procedures. In this article, I
demonstrate that these procedures do not study cheating behavior. This limitation, combined
with the motivation to theorize about the nature of cheating, has caused prior work to assert
competing predictions about the nature of dishonesty. Across one pilot study and three
preregistered experiments using online panels (N =1,408), I demonstrate that cheating and
lying are fundamentally different behaviors. Specifically, I show that the magnitude of
dishonesty and the affective consequences of dishonesty critically depend on the type of
dishonesty under investigation. By identifying these differences, I reconcile conflicting
findings in behavioral ethics and build a clear, conceptual foundation for future scholarship.
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Introduction
Corporate scandals have enormous economic effects, and they have spurred
scholars of behavioral ethics to scrutinize the nature of dishonesty. This research has been
broadly influential, affecting how governments, educational institutions, and
organizations go about identifying and mitigating dishonest conduct (Behavioural
Insights Team, 2012; Coughlan, 2015; Kristal et al., 2020). The experimental paradigms
scholars have used to investigate unethical behavior have assessed lying behavior. The
corporate scandals that motivate these investigations, however, are often examples of
cheating behavior (e.g., Welsh et al., 2015). In this article, I demonstrate that cheating
behavior and lying behavior differ both conceptually and empirically, and I use the
distinction between cheating and lying to reconcile anomalies in the literature.
As the behavioral ethics literature has grown, there has been a strong
methodological convergence in behavioral ethics experiments. Scholars have relied
almost exclusively on incentivized self-reporting procedures to assess dishonesty. In
these experiments, participants are given the opportunity to misreport their performance.
These experiments spurred a vast literature in behavioral ethics. Recent reviews (Abeler
et al., 2019; Gerlach et al., 2019) show that over the last 15 years, researchers have
recruited more than 63,000 individuals across 200 experiments to complete one of the
four most commonly used self-reporting procedures: the Coin Task (Bucciol & Piovesan,
2011), the Die Task (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi, Dana, et al., 2011), the
Matrix Task (Mazar et al., 2008), and the Sender Task (Gneezy, 2005).
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Each of the four canonical behavioral ethics paradigms measures lying behavior.
None measure cheating behavior. Although cheating has received scant academic
attention (Green, 2006), recent work has begun to investigate the concept of cheating as a
distinct form of workplace misconduct (Mitchell et al., 2018; Spoelma, 2021). Building
on this work, I define “cheating” as an activity that produces a false outcome. In contrast,
“lying” is the misreport of a true performance (Shalvi, Handgraaf, et al., 2011). Unlike
liars, cheaters often do not observe their honest performance. Rather, cheaters observe the
outcome they created outside the bounds of permissible conduct. Creating software to
change how a car runs during an emissions test is cheating; misreporting quarterly
earnings is lying.
In the canonical behavioral ethics experimental paradigms, the act of dishonesty
occurs after participants observe their true performance. The distinctions I make between
lying and cheating are consistent with definitions in the communications literature
(Bitterly & Schweitzer, 2020). Lies of commission involve active misrepresentations.
When an individual lies, they lie by commission; they observe the truth and misreport it.
When cheaters report their performance, they lie by omission, implicitly claiming that
their fraudulent performance is honest. In this work, I use the terms “deception,”
“dishonesty,” and “unethical behavior” as umbrella terms that encompass both cheating
and lying behavior.
Consider the Coin Task. In a simple version of the task, participants flip a fair
coin three times and are paid $1.00 for each Heads they self-report. A participant can lie
in the task if they flip Heads two times and self-report flipping Heads three times.
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Alternatively, a participant can cheat in the task if, prior to the start of the task, they
substitute their fair coin for an unfair coin that always yields Heads and then report
flipping Heads three times. In both cases, the participant earns $3.00. The difference lies
in the process through which the participant achieved the unethical outcome. Behavioral
ethics scholars have failed to make this distinction. In this work, I show that this
distinction is extremely important. For an exception, see work by Pacual-Ezama et al.
(2020), who studied behavior in the Coin Task and did distinguish participants who
misreported their outcomes (which I term lying) from participants who did not flip a coin
at all (which I term cheating).
Many of the unethical acts that motivate behavioral ethics research involve
cheating behavior, not lying behavior. For example, Volkswagen cheated to pass carbon
emissions tests (Vlasic, 2017). The company could not have simply self-reported their
cars’ CO2 emissions. They had to defeat the Environmental Protection Agency’s testing
equipment, and they had to know how to do it. Plagiarism, data fabrication, and receipt
doctoring are also examples of cheating. Whereas lying involves the simple misreport of
information, cheating involves the creation of fraudulent evidence.
Using methods that are only capable of measuring lying behavior (the four
canonical paradigms of unethical behavior all measure lying) has led existing work to
ignore the distinction between cheating and lying. When using self-reporting procedures,
prominent scholars have used the terms cheating and lying interchangeably (Fischbacher
& Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gino et al., 2011; Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017). For example, the
authors of the paper that introduced the Die Task, the most commonly used paradigm in
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behavioral ethics, titled their paper “Lies in Disguise: An Experimental Study on
Cheating” (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). Moreover, correlations between lying in
self-reporting tasks and transgressions outside of the laboratory have led scholars to
assert that self-reporting paradigms can be used as indicators for many, if not all, real-life
socially questionable behaviors (Cohn & Maréchal, 2018; Schild et al., 2021). Together,
these findings have led behavioral ethics scholars to assume that the predictions derived
from experiments using self-reporting procedures apply broadly to all types of unethical
behavior.
In this paper, I challenge this assumption. I show that the distinction between
cheating and lying is critically important for understanding the nature of dishonesty.
Specifically, I investigate the magnitude of dishonesty for cheating and lying behavior.
The magnitude of unethical behavior has been used to classify dishonest people (Hilbig
& Hessler, 2013) and underlies prominent theories of unethical behavior (Gino, 2015;
Gino et al., 2009; Mazar et al., 2008). On the one hand, if the magnitude of unethical
behavior is similar for cheating and lying, then theories derived from lying behavior
should apply to cheating behavior. On the other hand, if the magnitudes of unethical
behavior diverge, than cheating behavior may require its own theoretical framework.
The Truth Stretching Hypothesis
Many theories of behavioral ethics start with two empirical observations. One,
most dishonest individuals overclaim by slightly more than what they honestly deserve
(Khalmetski & Sliwka, 2019; Shalvi, Handgraaf, et al., 2011). Two, dishonest individuals
rarely claim the profit maximizing outcome. I refer to this pattern of dishonesty as truth
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stretching (Barkan et al., 2015; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004)
and the prediction that deception follows this pattern as the truth-stretching hypothesis.
Gerlach and colleagues’ (2019) recent meta-analysis of studies using the Matrix Task
illustrate the robustness of this pattern. Across 41 experiments, they showed that
dishonest participants leave, on average, roughly 14 matrices unsolved but overreport
their performance by just four matrices and almost never overreport having solved all 14
(Gerlach et al., 2019). Strong empirical support for the truth-stretching hypothesis has led
scholars to consider truth-stretching a prominent feature of unethical behavior (Gino,
2015).
I develop a conceptual argument and present data to assert that the truthstretching hypothesis does not apply to cheating behavior. I build my conceptual
argument on three observations. First, the truth-stretching hypothesis builds on results
that used self-reporting experimental paradigms. None of these studies measured cheating
behavior. Second, extant theories define dishonesty by the difference between the true
observation and the self-reported observation (Hilbig & Hessler, 2013). This difference
cannot be assessed for cheaters because they do not observe an honest outcome and lack
a salient counterfactual. Third, cheaters can often provide evidence to support their
overstated claim by completing the task in a way that appears honest (Mitchell et al.,
2018).
Integrating these observations suggests cheaters are more likely to deceive by
larger magnitudes than liars. The truth-stretching hypothesis appears robust because
dishonest individuals in self-reporting experiments observe their honest performance and
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cannot generate evidence to support a dishonest claim. In contexts in which unethical
participants can cheat, the magnitude of their unethical behavior may be very different.
Empirical evidence from outside the laboratory supports this theorizing. Prior work
analyzing corporate scandals have documented that some situations prompt people to
engage in a great deal of unethical behavior (Callahan, 2007; Wang & Murnighan, 2011).
In these situations, wrongdoers often provide documentation to support their fraudulent
claims.
By distinguishing cheating from lying and demonstrating that these are
conceptually distinct constructs, I challenge prior work and advance our understanding of
behavioral ethics both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, distinguishing
lying from cheating highlights the importance of the process through which individuals
engage in dishonest conduct. To lie, individuals simply self-report an outcome. To cheat,
individuals must identify and execute a more elaborate strategy. Cheating requires some
degree of innovation. This feature of unethical behavior is absent in experiments that rely
on incentivized self-reporting.
Moreover, dishonest individuals’ reluctance to overclaim by large magnitudes has
led prior work to expound on the internal processes that curb deception. For example,
scholars have highlighted the desire to maintain a positive self-concept as an explanation
for truth-stretching (Mazar et al., 2008; Teodorescu et al., 2021, p. 20). The pattern of
deception exhibited by executives at Volkswagen, Enron, and Wells Fargo, however, do
not resemble the truth-stretching pattern. By recognizing the distinction between lying
(self-reported behavior in experiments) and cheating (behavior in many corporate
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scandals), theories of behavioral ethics can begin to reconcile very different patterns of
unethical behavior.
Methodologically, this investigation answers the call “to put more conceptual
thought into what structural properties exactly differ between real-world situations that
offer the opportunity to behave dishonestly and how those situations, their properties, and
their prevalence can be represented in the experimental microworlds” (Gerlach et al.,
2019, p. 21). I answer this call by providing people with more than one way to act
unethically and assess not only whether people act unethically, but also which form of
unethical behavior they choose. Taken together, this article demonstrates that unethical
behavior can be measured without self-reporting procedures and reconciles conflicting
findings in behavioral ethics.
Overview of Studies
Across one pilot study and three main studies, I assess both cheating and lying
behavior. In the Pilot Study, I demonstrate that participants conceptualize both lying and
cheating behaviors in the paradigm as unethical. In each of the main studies, I investigate
whether the truth-stretching hypothesis applies to cheating behavior. To do so, I test
whether cheaters and liars commit the same amount of dishonesty and engage in similar
profit maximizing behavior. I assess cheating and lying when participants are given the
opportunity to engage in both behaviors (Study 1) and when they are randomly assigned
to a single opportunity to behave dishonestly (Studies 2 and 3).
In Study 3, I also assess the cognitive and emotional consequences of engaging in
each type of behavior. Specifically, I investigate the extent to which cheating and lying
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prompt positive affect and the extent to which cheaters and liars feel confident in their
ability to complete the task assigned to them.
I obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) exemption from full review (IRB#
849536). All manipulations, measures, and exclusions are reported. The data, materials,
and preregistrations for these studies are available here:
https://osf.io/wyxjh/?view_only=f1b91cbf168443988934b179a82b29e1
Pilot Study
To study lying and cheating behavior, I created an experimental paradigm called
the Typing Speed Task that can measure both. In the Pilot Study, I demonstrate that thirdparty observers judge both lying and cheating in this paradigm to be unethical. To show
this, I randomly assigned participants to read about prior participants who either cheated
or lied in the Typing Speed Task and answer questions about the ethicality of the
behavior. In the Typing Speed Task, participants are incentivized to type a character
string into a textbox. Participants can lie in the task by self-reporting that they typed more
strings than they actually typed. Participants can cheat in the task by copying and pasting
the string into the textbox.
Method
Participants. I posted a study to Prolific Academic for 225 participants. Only
U.S. citizens who currently live in the U.S. were eligible to participate. After following
the preregistered data exclusion plan (Table S1), the final sample consisted of 194 people
(82 women, 107 men, five indicated a different gender identity; Mage = 33.40, SDage =
11.78). Participants earned $0.50 for completing the study. I preregistered the study here:
https://aspredicted.org/YKP_NBB
129

Procedure. Participants learned that they would review the instructions of a prior
study. I informed participants that other prior participants had completed the study and
read the following instructions describing the Typing Speed Task:
In this study, we are interested in the typing speed and computer proficiency of
many people. On the next page, you will complete a Typing Speeding Task. You
will be shown a series of letters and numbers called a character string. Your task
is to type the character string as many times as you can in 90 seconds. To
incentivize you in this study, you will earn a bonus of $0.04 each time you
correctly type the character string.
Next, I randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions. Participants
assigned to the Evaluate Lying condition learned that after the earlier participants
completed the task, they had self-reported the number of times that they typed the
character string and earned a bonus based upon what they had self-reported. Participants
further learned that some of the earlier participants “overreported the number of times
that they typed the string in order to earn a larger bonus.” Participants assigned to the
Evaluate Cheating condition were told that some of the earlier participants “copied and
pasted the character string into the text box in order to earn a larger bonus.”
Dependent measures. Participants then answered questions about the ethicality,
the harm, and the potential consequences of the behavior they were assigned to review.
Specifically, participants answered: “To what extent do you think copying and pasting
the character string [overreporting one’s performance] in the Typing Speed Task is
unethical” (1 = Not at all unethical, 5 = Extremely unethical), “To what extent do you
think copying and pasting the character string [overreporting one’s performance] in the
Typing Speed Task harms the researcher conducting the study?” (1 = Causes no harm, 5
= Causes severe harm), and “How likely do you think it is that the experimenter who
130

conducted the study rejected the HITs of participants who copied and pasted the character
string [overreported their performance]?” (1 = Not at all likely, 5 = Extremely likely).
Text in brackets was presented to participants assigned to the Evaluate Lying condition.
Participants completed the study by indicating their age and gender and answering an
attention check.
Results. As shown in Figure 16, participants considered overreporting (M = 3.58,
SE = 0.12) and copying and pasting (M = 3.64, SE = 0.13) in the task to be similarly
unethical (t(192) = 0.34, p = .731, d = 0.05) and similarly harmful to the experimenter
(overreporting: M = 3.71, SE = 0.13, copying and pasting: M = 3.84, SE = 0.12, t(192) =
0.70, p =.484, d = 0.10). Participants differed in their beliefs about the consequences of
each behavior. Participants believed that copying and pasting was more likely to lead to
being rejected from the study (M = 3.93, SE = 0.11) relative to overreporting (M = 3.46,
SE = 0.12, t(192) = 2.85, p = .005, d = 0.41).
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Figure 16
Third-Party Judgments of Cheating and Lying Behavior in the Typing Speed Task

Note: The y axis represents scores on the dependent variables. Error bars represent ± 1
SEM.

Discussion
Third-party observers consider cheating in this paradigm (i.e., pasting text in the
Typing Speed Task) to be unethical. The study also shows that observers evaluate pasting
(cheating) and overreporting (lying) to be similarly unethical in this paradigm. Together,
these findings support the operationalization of assessing cheating via pasted text and
lying via overreported text in the Typing Speed Task. Informed by these results, I use this
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paradigm to investigate participants’ incentivized cheating and lying behavior in the main
studies.
Study 1
In Study 1, I test whether the truth-stretching hypothesis, the prediction that most
dishonest people are only slightly dishonest, applies for both cheating and lying behavior.
I provide participants the opportunity to both cheat and lie and assess the number of
people who cheat, who lie, and who both cheat and lie.
Method
Participants. I posted a study to Prolific Academic for 300 participants. Only
U.S. citizens who currently live in the U.S. were eligible to participate. After following
the preregistered data exclusion plan (Table S1), the final sample consisted of 278 people
(121 women, 151 men, five indicated a different gender identity, one preferred not to
state; Mage = 34.40, SDage = 12.13). Participants earned $0.50 plus a potential bonus for
completing the study. The study was preregistered here:
https://aspredicted.org/XJR_RQM.
Design. Upon entering the study, participants read the Typing Speed Task
instructions described in the Pilot Study. Participants then proceeded to the task and had
90 seconds to type the character string “Aa1Bb2Cc3Dd4Ee5”. As depicted in Figure 17, a
counter above the textbox showed participants their performance and recorded each time
they typed the string correctly. This provided participants with real-time feedback on
their performance. The textbox was limited to 314 characters. This ensured that the string
could not be pasted more than 20 times.
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After 90 seconds, participants proceeded to the next page and were told their
bonus would be determined by their reported performance. Participants then entered the
number of times they correctly typed the string. Participants could self-report typing a
maximum of 25 strings – five strings more than the textbox limit. This afforded all
participants, including those who chose to maximally cheat, the opportunity to lie and
over-report their performance. Participants completed the study by answering a brief
demographics questionnaire.
Figure 17
The Typing Speed Task in Study 1

Note: The “Number Correct” value increased by one each time participants typed or
pasted the character string correctly.

Analysis. In accordance with the preregistration, I classified participants as
“honest,” “cheaters,” “liars,” and “lying cheaters” depending on their actions in the
Typing Speed Task. Specifically, I labeled a participant “honest” if they accurately
reported the number of strings that they typed. I labeled a participant as a “cheater” if
they pasted the string into the textbox at least once and accurately reported the combined
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total number of strings that they pasted and typed. I labeled a participant as a “liar” if
they did not paste the string into the textbox, but overreported the number of strings that
they typed. I labeled a participant as a “lying cheater” if they pasted the string at least
once and then overreported the total number of strings that they pasted and typed.
To test the veracity of the truth-stretching hypothesis, I assessed the magnitude of
participants’ lying and cheating behavior. To determine the amount of lying, I subtracted
the number of strings each participant reported from the number of strings that they
typed.8 To assess the amount of cheating, I used JavaScript that counted the number of
pasted strings. The extent of cheating behavior ranged from 0-20 strings and the extent of
lying behavior ranged from 0-25 strings.
Results. As shown in Figure 18 (Panel A), 36% of participants chose to behave
unethically. Seventeen percent of participants cheated by pasting text into the text box
and another 17% lied by overreporting their performance. Just five participants (1.8% of
sample) both cheated in the task and lied by overreporting their performance.
I find support for the truth-stretching hypothesis for lying behavior but not for
cheating behavior. As shown in Figure 19, more than half of participants who lied did so
by one or two character strings (Panel A). Most cheaters, however, cheated by 10 or more
strings (Panel B). Whereas one participant reported the profit maximizing lie, nine
participants (3% of sample) engaged in the profit maximizing cheat (z = 2.55, p = .011).
Together, the pattern of lying differed significantly from the pattern of cheating (p <
.0001, N = 278, One-sample Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). On average, cheaters

8

If a participant underreported their performance by self-reporting that they typed fewer strings than they
had actually typed, I labeled the participant as honest because they did not overreport their performance.
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overclaimed by roughly three times the amount as liars (Mean strings pasted = 2.31, SE =
0.34; Mean strings overreported = 0.69, SE = 0.17, t(277) = 4.15, p < .0001, d = 0.25,
Figure 18 Panel B). These results reveal that cheaters are more willing to engage in larger
magnitudes of deception relative to liars.
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Figure 18
Rate and Magnitude of Cheating and Lying in Study 1

Panel A. Rates of Dishonesty in Study 1

Panel B. Average Performance in Study 1
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Note. This figure depicts the proportion of participants who chose to be honest, cheat, lie, and cheat and lie (Panel A)
and the average number of strings that participants chose to type, paste, and overreport (Panel B) in Study 1. Each error
bar represents ± 1 95% confidence interval derived using an OLS regression without predictors.

Figure 19
Patterns of Cheating and Lying in Study 1
Panel A. Lying Behavior

Panel B. Cheating Behavior
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Note. Panel A shows the distribution of unethical behavior for liars (N = 52). Panel B shows the distribution of
unethical behavior for cheaters (N = 51). Honest participants are not shown. See Figure S1 for representation of honest
participants.

Discussion
Study 1 shows that cheaters and liars deceive by different magnitudes. Most
participants who lied overreported their performance by one or two strings, providing
strong support for the truth-stretching hypothesis. Participants who cheated, however,
engaged in a different pattern, committing significantly more unethical behavior. The
most common form of cheating was to cheat as much as possible.
Study 1 also shows that cheaters appear to be averse to lying. Many cheaters
chose to maximize their profit when presented with the opportunity to cheat – cheating on
all 20 character strings. However, these same participants chose to be honest when
afforded the opportunity to overreport their performance by an additional five strings.
This latter finding shows that people’s willingness to engage in dishonesty is affected by
the type of dishonesty available.
Study 2
In Study 1, participants could both cheat and lie. This feature provides the
opportunity to investigate how people prefer one type of deception over the other. In
Study 2, I randomly assign participants to a single opportunity to behave unethically.
Participants are either prevented from cheating or are prevented from lying. This design
provides the opportunity to make causal claims about whether the truth-stretching
hypothesis applies to both cheating and lying behavior.
Method
Participants. I posted a study to Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) for 400
participants with the goal of retaining approximately 200 participants per condition. Only
U.S. citizens who currently live in the U.S. were eligible to participate. After following a
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preregistered data exclusion plan (Table S1), the final sample consisted of 390 people
(207 women, 180 men, two indicated a different gender identity, one preferred not to
state; Mage = 41.25, SDage = 12.32). Participants earned $0.55 plus a potential bonus for
completing the study. This study was preregistered here:
https://aspredicted.org/W8F_B28.
Design. The design of Study 2 was similar to Study 1. Upon entering the study,
participants read the introductory instructions describing the Typing Speed Task (see the
Pilot Study). On the next page, participants had 90 seconds to type the character string
Aa1Bb2Cc3Dd4Ee5 in the textbox. The textbox could not exceed 314 characters so that
participants could not enter the string into the textbox more than 20 times.
I randomly assigned participants to have the opportunity to lie or the opportunity
to cheat. Participants assigned to the Opportunity to Cheat condition were capable of
pasting text into the textbox but were not asked to self-report their performance. These
participants could only engage in unethical behavior by cheating (i.e., pasting text).
Participants assigned to the Opportunity to Lie condition could only engage in lying (i.e.,
overreporting their performance). I removed these participants’ cheating capability using
JavaScript that prevented participants from pasting text. If participants assigned to the
Opportunity to Lie condition tried to pasted text, no text would appear. After the Typing
Speed Task, participants in the Opportunity to Lie condition self-reported their
performance (text entry 0-20 strings). By preventing participants from cheating, and then
providing them with an opportunity to overreport their performance, participants in the
Opportunity to Lie condition were given the same opportunity to behave unethically as
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the participants who completed the incentivized self-reporting tasks (e.g., the Dice Task,
the Matrix Task).
Results
Analysis. In the primary analysis, I compare the number of dishonest strings
across conditions using an OLS regression with robust standard errors. For participants in
the Opportunity to Lie condition, the number of dishonest strings is the number of strings
overreported. For participants in the Opportunity to Cheat condition, the number of
dishonest strings is the number of strings that participants pasted.
Results. The results of Study 2 support the argument that the truth-stretching
hypothesis applies to lying but not cheating behavior. Conceptually replicating the
findings of Study 1 in a between-subjects design, participants in Study 2 who were given
the opportunity to cheat were far more dishonest than were participants who were given
the opportunity to lie (Figure 20). On average, participants in the Opportunity to Cheat
condition deceived by more than three times the magnitude (Mean strings pasted = 3.14,
SE = 0.46) as participants in the Opportunity to Lie condition (Mean strings overreported
= 0.83, SE = 0.18, t(389) = 4.63, p < .0001, d = 0.46). Moreover, a larger percentage of
participants in the Opportunity to Cheat condition (3%) deceived by the profitmaximizing amount (i.e., 20 strings) compared to participants in the Opportunity to Lie
condition (0%, p = 0.03, two-sided Fisher’s exact test). The overall pattern of dishonesty
across the two conditions differed significantly (p = .009, N = 390, Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test).
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Figure 20
Patterns of Cheating and Lying in Study 2

Panel A. Lying Behavior

Panel B. Cheating Behavior
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Note. Panel A shows the distribution of unethical behavior for participants assigned to the Opportunity to Lie condition
(N = 50). Panel B shows the distribution of unethical behavior for participants assigned to the Opportunity to Cheat
condition (N = 46). Honest participants are not shown. See Figure S2 for representation of honest participants.

Discussion
Study 2 represents the first study to experimentally manipulate the opportunity to
either lie or cheat. By conflating lying and cheating, behavioral ethics scholars have
presumed that the truth-stretching hypothesis is applicable to both types of unethical
behavior. In contrast to this presumption, I find that individuals’ unethical behavior
heavily depends on the opportunity they have to engage in either lying or cheating. When
participants are provided the opportunity to self-report their performance (and lie), the
data from Study 2 aligns with prior findings that support the truth-stretching hypothesis
(Gerlach et al., 2019). When provided with the opportunity to cheat, however,
participants in Study 2 demonstrated a very different profile, and much higher
magnitudes, of unethical behavior.
Study 3
In Study 3, I continue to investigate the truth-stretching hypothesis and explore
the cognitive and emotional consequences following cheating and lying behavior. As in
Study 2, I randomly assigned participants in Study 3 to have either the opportunity to lie
or the opportunity to cheat in the Typing Speed Task. After the task, participants
indicated how they felt and how confident they were about their typing skills.
Prior work has made two observations regarding how people feel after engaging
in dishonesty. First, scholars have argued that a person’s degree of guilt is positively
correlated with the size of their deception (Gneezy et al., 2018). Leading theories in
behavioral ethics identify anticipatory guilt as an important factor that contributes to the
truth-stretching hypothesis (Ogunfowora et al., 2021). Second, scholars have asserted that
positive affective responses following dishonesty (e.g., a “cheaters high”) “occur only
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rarely” (Ellemers et al., 2019, p. 353). In Study 3, I test whether these affective responses
apply to both cheating and lying behavior. I also included an item assessing participants
perceived ability to investigate whether cheating and lying resulted in different levels of
overconfidence after completing the task.
Method
Participants. I posted a study to MTurk for 550 participants. Only U.S. citizens
who currently live in the U.S. were eligible to participate. After following the
preregistered data exclusion plan (Table S1), the final sample consisted of 546 people
(309 women, 233 men, four preferred not to state; Mage = 40.07, SDage = 12.62).
Participants earned $0.65 plus a potential bonus for completing the study. This study was
preregistered here: https://aspredicted.org/YPD_XQH.
Design. As in Study 2, participants in Study 3 were randomly assigned to either
the Opportunity to Lie condition or the Opportunity to Cheat condition and completed the
Typing Speed Task. The Typing Speed Task differed slightly from the task used in Study
2. In Study 3, participants were asked to type a different 15-character string (i.e.,
dfUF9kWnKg3yFk2) and were provided a shorter amount of time (i.e., 60 seconds) to
complete the task. Participants could not enter the string into the textbox more than 15
times. Participants in the Opportunity to Lie condition could self-report typing the
character string a maximum of 15 times.
After participants completed the task, participants answered three questions to
assess their positive and negative feelings. To assess positive affect, participants
indicated how excited, clever, and intelligent they felt, and to assess negative affect,
144

participants indicated how guilty, nervous, and upset they felt (all items 1 = Very
slightly/not at all, 5 = Extremely). All items were presented on a single page and in
random order. On the next page, I assessed how participants felt about their typing skills
with the item: “How good do you think your typing skills are compared to other
participants taking this study?” (1 = Not at all good, 7 = Extremely Good). Participants
then completed the study by indicating their age and gender.
Results
Analysis. I preregistered the same analysis plan as Study 2 to investigate the
truth-stretching hypothesis. To assess the consequences of each type of deception, I
grouped participants by their choice to be honest or dishonest and tested the interaction
effect of condition assignment and participants’ choice on the six emotion measures and
the ability measure. I identified participants as “honest” in the Opportunity to Cheat
condition if they did not paste text and “honest” in the Opportunity to Lie condition if
they did not overreport their performance. I identified participants as “dishonest” in the
Opportunity to Cheat condition if they pasted at least one string and “dishonest” in the
Opportunity to Lie condition if they overreported their performance by at least one string.
The models testing the three positive emotion measures and three negative emotion
measures are susceptible to the problem of multiple comparisons. I therefore present
Bonferroni-corrected p values adjusted for three comparisons. I use an OLS regression
with robust standard errors in each model.
Results. I replicate the results of Study 2 that showed support for the truthstretching hypothesis for lying behavior but not for cheating behavior (Figure 21). On
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average, participants in the Opportunity to Cheat condition deceived by more than twice
the magnitude (Mean strings pasted = 1.82, SE = 0.27) of those in the Opportunity to Lie
condition (Mean strings overreported = 0.81, SE = 0.11, t(545) = 7.40, p = .001, d =
0.30). The overall pattern of dishonesty differed across conditions (p < .0001, N = 546,
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) where a larger percentage of participants in the Opportunity
to Cheat condition (3%) deceived by the profit-maximizing amount (i.e., 15 strings)
compared to participants in the Opportunity to Lie condition (0%, p = 0.002, two-sided
Fisher's exact test).
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Figure 21
Patterns of Cheating and Lying in Study 3
Panel A

Panel B
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Note. Panel A shows the distribution of unethical behavior for liars (N = 98). Panel B shows the distribution of
unethical behavior for cheaters (N = 45). Honest participants are not shown. See Figure S3 for representation of honest
participants.

Consequences following Dishonesty. The affective and cognitive consequences
of unethical behavior depended on whether participants lied or cheated. Figure 22 shows
the three interactions effects that remained significant after adjusting for multiple
comparisons (see Table S2 for results for each item). Participants who chose to cheat in
the Opportunity to Cheat condition felt more clever than did participants who chose to
deceive in the Opportunity to Lie condition and honest participants (interaction effect: B
= 0.93, SE = 0.24, p < .001, Figure 22 Panel A). Exploratory analysis showed that about
half (49%) of deceptive participants in the Opportunity to Cheat condition selected a
scale point at or above the midpoint of the scale, but just 17% of deceptive participants in
the Opportunity to Lie condition did the same (χ2 (N = 153, 1) = 15.47, p < .0001). These
results show that a “cheater’s high” is not a rare affective response to dishonesty
(Ellemers et al., 2019), but rather an affective response that more likely follows cheating
than lying.
In line with prior theorizing (Ogunfowora et al., 2021), the magnitude of
deception was positively correlated with feelings of guilt (r = .23, p < .0001). Unethical
participants in the Opportunity to Cheat condition were more unethical than other
participants and so felt more guilty than other participants (interaction effect: B = 0.55,
SE = 0.21, p = .026, Figure 22 Panel B). Unethical participants in the Opportunity to
Cheat condition felt more clever (a positive feeling), more guilty (a negative feeling), and
overall were less upset (interaction effect: B = -0.67, SE = 0.18, p < .001, Figure 22 Panel
C).
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As shown in Figure 23, unethical participants in the Opportunity to Cheat
condition felt that they were better typists than other participants. Dishonest participants
in the Opportunity to Lie condition felt similarly confident in their ability to type as
honest participants. However, unethical participants in the Opportunity to Cheat
condition felt significantly more confident (interaction effect: B = 1.82, SE = 0.33, p <
.0001) than other groups of participants. These results reveal that cheating and lying can
lead to both different affective responses and different cognitive perceptions.
In exploratory analysis, I investigated whether these affective and cognitive
changes mediated the relationship between participant’s condition assignment and the
magnitude of deception (See SOM for details). The results show that the emotional and
cognitive changes observed in Study 3 are consequences that follow deception, but they
do not explain why participants engaged in the unethical behavior that they did.
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Figure 22
Affective Response Following Cheating and Lying in Study 3

Panel A. Feeling Clever

Panel B. Feeling Guilt

Panel C. Feeling Upset

Note. Participants indicated how they felt after completing the Typing Speed Task in Study 3.
This figure shows the relationship between participants’ opportunity (i.e., condition assignment)
and choice to be honest or deceptive on cleverness (Panel A), guilt (Panel B), and upset (Panel
C). Each panel shows the marginal effects of an OLS regression with robust standard errors. The
predictor variables were participant’s condition assignment, participant’s choice, and the
interaction term of these two variables. Each error bar represents ±1 SEM.
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Figure 23
Perceived Ability Following Cheating and Lying in Study 3

Note. This figure shows the relationship between participants’ opportunity (i.e., condition
assignment) and choice to be honest or deceptive on their self-reported ability following
the Typing Speed Task. Point estimates represent the marginal effects of an OLS
regression with robust standard errors. The predictor variables were participants’
condition assignment, participants’ choice, and the interaction term of these two
variables. Each error bar represents ±1 SEM.
Discussion
These results provide further support that cheating and lying are qualitatively
distinct. In Study 3, I replicate the findings of Studies 1 and 2 with respect to the truthstretching hypothesis. Liars’ behaviors are consistent with the truth-stretching hypothesis;
cheaters’ behaviors are inconsistent with the truth-stretching hypothesis. Furthermore,
Study 3 provides insight into two additional empirical differences between lying and
cheating behavior. First, whereas liars indicated feeling little positive affect, cheaters,
consistent with the “cheater’s high” (Reudy et al., 2013), felt positive after engaging in
deception. The positive affect that follows cheating co-occurs with feelings of guilt,
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showing that cheating can lead to the co-occurrence of both positive and negative affect.
Second, cheating can lead to different cognitive perceptions than lying. Participants who
cheated felt more confident in their abilities than did participants who lied.
General Discussion
Cheating and lying are not the same. One is an activity; the other is a report.
Cheaters find alternative methods to achieve their desired outcome; liars simply report
the outcome they desire. Despite these differences, prior work has conflated cheating and
lying. Scholars have applied the same theories and experimental paradigms to investigate
both and continue to use the terms interchangeably (e.g., Balasubramanian et al., 2017;
Charness et al., 2019; Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017). I have shown that this conflated
conceptualization lacks the precision necessary for reliable behavioral predictions.
In each study, I identify results for lying behavior that are consistent with prior
behavioral ethics research—that has operationalized unethical behavior as lying behavior,
but I falsify predictions generated by these same paradigms when I report results for
cheating behavior. In Studies 1-3, I find strong support for the truth-stretching hypothesis
when applied to lying behavior. Liars most often lied by just one or two character strings
and almost never lied to the profit maximizing level. In contrast to this pattern, I find
strong evidence in each study to reject the truth-stretching hypothesis when applied to
cheating behavior. Cheaters on average cheated by twice the magnitude of liars and often
cheated to maximize their profit.
In Study 3, I investigated the cognitive and emotional consequences of lying and
cheating behavior. In line with prior work, feelings of guilt positively correlated with the
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magnitude of deception (Ogunfowora et al., 2021). I advance this line of research by
revealing when feelings of guilt are likely to co-occur with positive affect following
unethical behavior. Cheaters are more likely than liars to feel positive affect because
cheaters identify and execute a creative strategy and feel relatively more confident in
their abilities. These observations not only reconcile the laboratory investigation that first
identified the “cheaters high” (Reudy et al., 2013) with evidence from deception studies
that found little change in positive affect (Ellemers et al., 2019), but also reveals a more
nuanced accounting of the emotional consequences of dishonesty. Unethical behavior
does not always lead to either positive or negative affect. Rather, the affective response
following unethical behavior depends upon the type of unethical behavior individuals
committed.
These findings have five major theoretical implications. First, the results highlight
the limitations of extant behavioral ethics theory. The large increase of behavioral ethics
scholarship has been motivated in part by corporate scandals. Many published articles in
top management journals in behavioral ethics reference Wells Fargo, Volkswagen, or
Enron as motivating exemplars for the behaviors under investigation (Ebrahimi et al.,
2020; Spoelma, 2021). All of these companies engaged in cheating behaviors, but
scholarly investigations that use cheating scandals to motivate their work proceed to
study lying behavior. This conflation may explain why many organizational theorists
assert predictions about dishonesty at odds with the experimental data generated in selfreporting experiments. For example, organizational theorists have speculated that certain
environments produce large amounts of dishonesty (Callahan, 2007; Rose et al., 2020).
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The first step toward a reconciliation of what organizational theorists predict and what
experimental studies find is to recognize that they observe different kinds of behavior.
Experimental work has almost exclusively investigated lying behavior, and results from
this behavior have informed theories that have been broadly applied to all types of
unethical behavior. By tailoring theoretical predictions to more specific behaviors, we
may be able to reconcile field and lab research and bring the two literatures into a more
complementary relationship.
Second, this work challenges the existing typologies of dishonest conduct. Many
investigations in behavioral ethics have sought to group participants by their degree of
dishonesty. For example, Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi labeled some dishonest
participants “partial liars” and others “profit maximizers” (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi,
2013) and Hilbig and Theilmann labelled participants “brazen liars”, “corruptible liars”,
and “small sinners.” (Hilbig & Thielmann, 2017). These typologies are based on the
degree, or amount, that people overclaim. The present findings demonstrate a difference
in kind and suggest that there is far more heterogeneity among dishonest individuals than
the extant taxonomies suggest. The results of Study 1 reveal that people make a choice
about the type of dishonesty in which they are willing to engage, that very few
participants both cheat and lie, and that cheaters do not often proceed to lie over and
above their fraudulent performance. This work underscores the importance of describing
dishonest individuals by something more than the amount of money they dishonestly take
(Cuadrado et al., 2021; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2020).
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Third, this work demonstrates that self-reporting procedures identify only a
fraction of dishonest people. The rates of dishonesty in these experiments have been used
as approximations for the rates of dishonesty in the world (Gächter & Schulz, 2016). The
evidence presented here suggests that this work may underestimate the true amount of
dishonesty. As the present studies show, roughly half of the number of people who were
dishonest would not have been identified if cheating could not be detected.
Fourth, this work makes significant methodological contributions. Recent
scholarship has introduced many novel variations of the standard self-reporting
procedures (Choshen-Hillel et al., 2020; Pascual-Ezama et al., 2020). By and large, these
variations are designed to accomplish three goals: to ensure that participants do not know
that their honesty is being evaluated, to ensure that participants do not feel they are being
labeled as dishonest by the experimenter, and, when possible, to identify dishonesty at the
individual level. None of the extant variations of self-reporting procedures have
accomplished these three goals. This is, in part, because simply asking participants to
self-report their performance often makes them skeptical about the purpose of the task
(Skowronek, 2021), and in part because the experimenters’ interest in labelling
participants as dishonest competes with participants’ sense of anonymity.
I argue that the Typing Speed Task accomplishes these three goals. The task does
not rely on documenting self-reported performance (i.e., lying behavior). Rather,
dishonesty can be assessed within the task itself (i.e., cheating), at the individual level,
and without raising the same suspicions that self-reporting procedures do. This
innovation creates a new class of experimental paradigms that can differentiate between
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cheating and lying behavior. Paradigms with this capability promise to move the field of
behavioral ethics beyond the limitations of extant approaches.
Finally, at a practical level, this work should inform mitigation strategies.
Submitting overtime or business-related travel expenses are often used as examples of
self-reporting in organizations (Gino & Margolis, 2011; Rilke et al., 2016). Organizations
prevent employees from self-reporting these submissions and require that employees
provide evidence for what they submit. These systems are designed to prevent lying
behavior but may in fact miss cheating behavior. By identifying diverging profiles of
dishonesty, managers may better understand the different behaviors in which their
employees might engage. As the findings presented in this article suggested, mitigation
strategies for lying may not deter cheating.
Future Directions
The three experiments in this paper represent the first empirical distinction
between cheating and lying behavior in an effort-based task. I investigate the nature of
cheating and lying and identify the antecedents, consequences, and third-party
perceptions that follow from each behavior. I deploy multiple versions of a new paradigm
and retested the behavioral predictions across studies. I call for future work to test
additional predictions made in the literature. A large body of experimental work makes
predictions about the nature of unethical behavior. Future work should test these
predictions and distinguish between lying and cheating.
Future research should also identify environmental antecedents that are likely to
promote one type of deception or another. Additionally, personality factors such as guilt156

proneness and Machiavellianism have been strongly associated with dishonesty (Jones &
Paulhus, 2017; Levine et al., 2018). How these personality traits correlate with each type
of deception is an open question for future research.
Conclusion
Behavioral ethics scholarship has sought to understand the psychology of
unethical behavior. The dominant paradigms scholars have used in this literature,
however, have only measured lying behavior and developed theories informed by these
limited results. In this work, I draw the conceptual distinction between cheating and lying
and show that this dichotomy provides greater theoretical clarity. By advancing
behavioral ethics beyond lying, we may better understand the nature of unethical
behavior.
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